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Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations:
A Comparative View
Current rules in most U.S. jurisdictions prohibit judges from be-
coming involved in plea negotiations and limit the judges' role to re-
viewing a plea bargain once it is presented by the parties. This Article
surveys three systems that provide for more significant judicial in-
volvement-Germany, Florida, and Connecticut-and suggests that a
judge's early input into plea negotiations can render the final disposi-
tion more accurate and procedurally just. Based on interviews with
practitioners and a review of the case law, the Article outlines a model
for greater judicial involvement in plea negotiations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In plea bargaining, as in many areas of the American criminal
justice system, the role of the judge is essentially passive.' In an ad-
versarial system like ours, the parties initiate the case and direct its
progress, including its possible disposition as a plea bargain. The
judge's role is limited to reviewing the bargain once it is presented.
Many jurisdictions, including the federal, expressly prohibit judges
from participating in or commenting on the plea negotiations.
There are important reasons for preferring passive, after-the-fact
participation by the judge in plea bargaining. Greater involvement
could interfere with the judge's impartiality and place undue pres-
sure on a defendant to accept a plea deal. This concern is magnified
when the same judge who participates in unsuccessful plea negotia-
tions also presides over the defendant's later trial and sentencing.
Furthermore, because judges are more distant from the investigation
than the parties are, they may not have a full understanding of what
* Assistant Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. I would like to
thank Albert Alschuler, Stephanos Bibas, Claus Kress, MAximo Langer, Bella Sewall,
John Turner, Thomas Weigend, and Ronald Wright for their helpful comments on this
project. Special thanks to Thomas Weigend for inviting me to use the Institute for
Comparative and International Law at the University of Cologne as the base from
which to conduct the interviews, and to Philipp Esser, Ursula Heinen, and Heinz-
Christian Esser for their hospitality in Cologne. Thanks also go to all the people who
helped me set up the interviews, including Thomas Weigend, Philipp Esser, Heinz-
Christian Esser, Paollina Gueorgieva, and Evgenia Nikolova, and to all the judges
and practitioners who took part in the study.
1. E.g., ABAu S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASsIVE JuDIcIARY 4 (1981).
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is at stake in the negotiations, so their involvement may not be espe-
cially helpful. Judicial involvement may also be too costly and may
ultimately undermine the efficiency of plea bargaining.
While these are valid concerns, there is reason to think that we
have overestimated the costs of judicial participation in plea negotia-
tions and underestimated its benefits. Many commentators have ar-
gued that the current approach to plea bargaining does not guard
effectively against the main risks of the process-coercion, unfair-
ness, and inaccurate verdicts. Recent evidence suggests that in the
federal system, and possibly in some states, defendants may be aban-
doning meritorious defenses and pleading guilty to avoid the uncer-
tainty of a trial and the risk of substantially higher sentences. The
lack of transparency of the negotiations and the belated involvement
of judges makes it nearly impossible to determine if individual prose-
cutors, defense attorneys, or systemic pressures may be inducing de-
fendants to accept unfair bargains and inaccurate verdicts.
In this Article, I offer evidence of the practical effects of greater
judicial participation and suggest that such participation has the po-
tential to reduce the risks of plea bargaining, at a lesser cost than
commonly assumed. A survey of Germany, Florida, and Connecti-
cut-three systems that provide for more significant judicial involve-
ment-suggests that a judge's early input into plea negotiations can
render the final disposition more accurate and procedurally just.
Judges can provide a neutral assessment of the merits of the case and
prod the defense attorney or the prosecutor to accept a fairer resolu-
tion. They can also offer a more accurate estimate of the expected
post-plea and post-trial sentences, which is especially valuable in sys-
tems of indeterminate sentencing. Finally, the involvement of an im-
partial party can render the bargaining process more transparent
and more acceptable to the public.
Understanding the plea bargaining systems of Germany, Flor-
ida, and Connecticut requires more than a review of the formal rules
of these jurisdictions. I have therefore supplemented my research of
the case law and scholarly literature with interviews with defense
attorneys, prosecutors, and judges in each jurisdiction, conducted
over the telephone, in person, and through written questionnaires. 2 I
sought to contact a range of practitioners and judges in various geo-
graphic regions,3 though the representativeness of the sample was
2. In Germany, 28 interviews were conducted in person, and four written ques-
tionnaires were gathered. In Florida, nine interviews were conducted by phone, two
were conducted in person, and two were received in writing. In Connecticut, nine in-
terviews were conducted by phone, and four were received in writing.
3. In all three jurisdictions, the initial sample was gathered through research on
the Internet and to some extent through personal contacts. In Germany, most inter-
views were conducted in the summer of 2004 in Cologne, where I was fortunate to
have the support of Professor Thomas Weigend and the Institute for Comparative and
International Law at the University of Cologne. Other interviews took place in Bonn,
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limited by the availability and responsiveness of practitioners. This
study should not be seen as rigorous qualitative research; it is closer
to what Albert Alschuler called "legal journalism" in his own study of
plea bargaining 30 years ago.4
Part II of this Article discusses the costs and benefits of the cur-
rent federal rule prohibiting judges from participating in plea negoti-
ations. It concludes that the delayed involvement of the judge at the
plea colloquy has failed to minimize the risk that guilty pleas might
be coerced, uninformed, or inconsistent with the true facts of the
case. Part III turns to a description of the German system of plea
bargaining, in which judges closely supervise most plea negotiations.
German judges regularly initiate and lead the negotiations them-
selves, and may gather further evidence or dismiss charges where the
plea does not seem to correspond to the facts. To show how judicial
involvement can work in systems closer to home, Part IV describes
two American models of involving judges in the negotiations-what I
call the "information source" and "moderator" models. Florida's prac-
tice, described in IV.A, is an example of the "information source"
model, in which judges do not actively participate in negotiations, but
make clear to the parties what disposition would be acceptable to the
court. Part IV.B focuses on Connecticut's practice, which falls further
along the spectrum toward greater judicial participation. Connecti-
cut judges are actively involved in the negotiations as moderators
and comment not only on the ultimate sentence acceptable to the
court, but also on the merits of the case. To prevent judicial coercion,
the judge who participates in pretrial negotiations is prohibited from
presiding over the trial involving the same defendant.
After examining each system in turn, Part V discusses the les-
sons we can learn from the three models. I argue that the German
model, which entrusts the judge with the duty to ensure the fairness
and accuracy of plea bargaining, is in many respects superior to Flor-
ida's information source model, which uses the judge primarily to re-
duce uncertainty in the bargaining process. The German model also
has distinct advantages over Connecticut's moderator model, which
does not provide judges with adequate tools to address failures of rep-
Munich, Mannheim, Leipzig, Berlin, and Hamburg, covering both eastern and west-
ern (Leipzig and Berlin vs. Cologne, Hamburg, and Munich), southern and northern
parts of the country (Munich vs. Hamburg), a couple of smaller towns (Mannheim and
Leipzig) as well as larger cities (Berlin, Munich, Cologne, Hamburg). The translation
of the German interviews is my own. In Florida and Connecticut, most interviews
were conducted over the phone during 2005 and involved practitioners from different
cities, although New Haven and Orlando were somewhat overrepresented, and Miami
was underrepresented.
4. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney and Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179, 1181 & n.8 (1975); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea
Bargaining, Part 1, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1061 n.10 (1976). Alschuler's article is
the first and only piece to seriously consider and advocate greater involvement by
judges in plea negotiations.
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resentation during the plea negotiations. At the same time, Florida
and Connecticut have instituted important safeguards against judi-
cial coercion that are not yet available in Germany. This Article con-
cludes by suggesting that features of the Florida, Connecticut and
German models could usefully be incorporated into the systems of
other American jurisdictions, particularly the federal system.
Though judicial involvement is not likely to eliminate all risks of plea
bargaining, it is likely to minimize some of the gravest dangers of the
practice: that a plea bargain does not reflect the true facts of the case,
is unfair to the defendant, or is inconsistent with the public interest.
II. JUDGES AS PASSIVE VERIFIERS OF PLEA BARGAINS
A. Reasons for Judicial Passivity in Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining is the method of resolving the vast majority of
criminal cases in the United States. Yet most American jurisdictions
have refrained from involving judges in plea negotiations. The com-
mon practice is for judges to review a guilty plea to ensure that it is
voluntary and knowing, but only after the plea is concluded between
the parties. This model of the judge as a passive verifier was en-
dorsed by the first edition of the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice5
and has been followed in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and many state systems.6
Under Federal Rule 11, judges may not take any part in plea
negotiations or even make comments that might indirectly influence
the bargaining process. Accordingly, judges must be cautious in giv-
ing reasons for rejecting a plea agreement. Any "remarks directed to
future or ongoing plea negotiations which suggest what will satisfy
the court transform the court from an impartial arbiter to a partici-
pant in the plea negotiations" and are forbidden by Rule 11.7 The
5. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.3(a) (Supp. 1968) ("The
trial judge should not participate in plea discussions.").
6. At least nine states and the District of Columbia prohibit judicial participa-
tion in plea negotiations: Alaska, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Maine,
Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. State v. Abraham,
566 P.2d 267, 270 (Alaska 1977); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-7-302 (1) (2000) (prohibitingjudicial participation, but allowing judge, upon request by the parties, to indicate
before the plea whether he would accept terms of the agreement); Boyd v. United
States, 703 A.2d 818, 821 (D.C. 1997); McDaniel v. State, 522 S.E.2d 648, 650 (Ga.
1999); In re Cox, 553 A.2d 1255, 1258 (Me. 1989); Magee v. State, 759 So.2d 464, 470(Miss. Ct. App. 2000); Commonwealth v. Evans, 252 A.2d 689 (Pa. 1969); Ex parte
Shuflin, 528 S.W.2d 610, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Wakefield, 925 P.2d
183, 187-89 (Wash. 1996); State v. Williams, 666 N.W.2d 58, 60, 65 (Wis. 2003).
Other state courts have not held outright that judicial participation invalidates a
plea, but have strongly discouraged such participation. People v. Weaver, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 742, 755-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Anyanwu, 681 N.W.2d 411, 414(Minn. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Moore, 547 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996);
Standley v. Warden, 990 P.2d 783, 785 (Nev. 1999); State v. Byrd, 407 N.E.2d 1384,1388 (Ohio 1980).
7. United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 455 (7th Cir. 1998).
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Rule prohibits the trial judge from even observing that there may be
a difference in the sentence to be imposed in the event of a plea bar-
gain as opposed to after trial.8
There are important reasons for this prohibition. The judge's
participation in negotiations may seem to interfere with her role as
an impartial arbiter, particularly if the same judge who participates
in the negotiations would preside over a subsequent trial and sen-
tencing of the defendant. It may also, directly or indirectly, coerce a
defendant to plead guilty. As the Federal Rules Advisory Committee
commented, the judge's "awesome power to impose a substantially
longer or even maximum sentence in excess of that proposed is pre-
sent whether referred to or not. A defendant needs no reminder that
if he rejects the proposal, stands upon his right to trial and is con-
victed, he faces a significantly longer sentence."9
Beyond coercion, various other reasons support the prohibition
on judicial participation in plea negotiations. The process of involv-
ing the judge may be seen as cumbersome and costly. And where
judicial involvement actually speeds up case disposition, observers
may be concerned that judges sacrifice fairness and accuracy for the
sake of moving the docket along.10 In some cases, the judge's partici-
pation may also be perceived as undue interference with
prosecutorial functions. Where prosecutors use plea negotiations as
a means to induce an accused to cooperate in other investigations, the
judge's participation-indeed the mere presence of the judge-might
undermine these prosecutorial tactics. Finally, some believe that
judges are too distant from the facts of the case and from the parties
involved to be able to make a useful contribution to the plea
negotiations."
8. United States v. Casallas, 59 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that Rule 11
was violated where trial court judge suggested that the defendant would face a 10-
year minimum mandatory term if he pleaded guilty and a 15-year minimum
mandatory term if he did not). States that prohibit judicial participation in bargain-
ing have similar bans on comments about the likely sentence. E.g., McDaniel, 522
S.E.2d 648.
9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, advisory committee's note (1974 amendment) (quoting
United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
10. Judith Resnik has expressed concern about the rise of "managerial judges,"
who guide pretrial proceedings primarily with an eye toward expediting cases, and
often at the expense of accuracy and fairness. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982). While Resnik described managerial judging in civil cases,
Miximo Langer has argued that the same phenomenon can be observed in criminal
cases in Germany and at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia. Mdximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Global-
ization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 44-45 (2004); Miximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in
International Criminal Law, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 835 (2005).
11. Telephone Interview with Nancy Daniels, Public Defender, 2d Jud. Cir., Flor-
ida, June 23, 2005; Telephone Interview with Wayne Durden, State Attorney's Office,
10th Jud. Cir., Florida, Nov. 2, 2005.
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While all of these concerns are valid, some of them are inherent
in the plea bargaining process itself, and it is not clear to what extent
judicial participation magnifies them. For example, the common un-
derstanding that there is a difference between the sentence offered in
a plea deal and the sentence after trial will tend to encourage a defen-
dant to plead guilty, regardless of any remarks made by the judge.
Whether this is a good thing may depend on the degree of the differ-
ential and the circumstances of the particular case, but the risk is
present, with or without judicial participation. In fact, as the next
Section suggests, judicial involvement may limit the coerciveness of
plea discounts by informing the defendant of the real difference be-
tween the post-plea and post-trial sentence-which may well be
lower than that anticipated by the parties. Additionally, judicial in-
put may reduce the influence of prosecutorial tactics such as threats
and bluffing, which also tend to coerce the defendant into accepting a
plea deal.
The next Section shows that there are other important reasons
for giving judges a greater role in the process. The party-driven
method of plea negotiations has not been an effective safeguard
against the risk that negotiations would produce a plea that is unin-
formed, unfair, or lacking factual basis. A review of these risks-and
the failure of the existing procedures to guard against them-may
lead us to reconsider the decision to keep judges out of plea
negotiations.
B. The Risks of Plea Bargaining
1. Risk of Coercion
One of the long-recognized dangers of plea bargaining is that it
might coerce an innocent defendant to plead guilty. Two features of
our current federal system are especially concerning in this respect-
harsh sentences and steep discounts for pleading guilty. Together,
they may induce even defendants with good odds of prevailing at trial
to accept a plea bargain. And if a steep sentencing discount is accom-
panied by prosecutorial bluffing or scare tactics, the danger of coer-
cion becomes especially grave.
Courts have acknowledged that the sentencing discounts offered
in exchange for guilty pleas can pressure defendants to waive their
right to trial. To some degree, this is accepted as a legitimate and
inevitable part of plea bargaining. As the Supreme Court has stated,
"While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punish-
ment clearly may have a discouraging effect on the defendant's asser-
tion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices is an
204 [Vol. 54
inevitable-and permissible-attribute of any legitimate system
which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas."12
In condoning these pressures of plea bargaining, courts have
noted that the criminal justice system has many features that are
coercive but entirely legitimate. For example, the fact of indictment
alone might pressure some accused to plead guilty.' 3 The question,
then, is not of mere pressure, but of undue pressure, or coercion. If a
system is so coercive as to cause innocent defendants to plead guilty,
the line has clearly been crossed. Inducing a guilty defendant to ac-
cept a higher sentence, based on incorrect facts or an incorrect legal
interpretation of the crime, may also be seen as undue coercion.
Over the last two decades, increasingly harsh sentences, com-
bined with steep sentencing discounts, have imposed great pressure
on defendants to plead guilty. Since 1984, mandatory sentencing
laws, the federal sentencing guidelines, and the abolition of parole
have led to a sharp rise in sentence length.14 In addition to increas-
ing sentences, the federal system has offered defendants substantial
rewards for pleading guilty. The federal sentencing guidelines made
these rewards clear and visible to defendants. Under the guidelines,
defendants who plead guilty receive a sentence discount of about one-
third just for pleading guilty and "accepting responsibility."15 Statis-
tics from federal courts suggest that defendants who plead guilty
often receive additional discounts as well. In 2003, the average sen-
tence given for offenses resolved by guilty plea was 54.7 months,
while the average sentence for offenses resolved by trial was 153.7
months.16 The plea discount appears to be roughly the same for each
type of crime. These numbers suggest that the average sentencing
discount is closer to two-thirds off the expected trial sentence. " Such
significant discounts may persuade even defendants with fairly good
chances of acquittal to plead guilty.
A recent study by Ronald Wright reveals the distorting influence
that deep discounts for "acceptance of responsibility" and "substan-
tial assistance" have had on plea bargains. The study found that fed-
eral districts that rely most heavily on these types of discounts have
had not only a higher rate of guilty pleas, but also a lower rate of
12. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 209-10 (1995).
13. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
14. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Crimi-
nal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 129 (2005).
15. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of the Law, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2463, 2535 (2004).
16. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
70, 75 tbl. 5.3 (2003).
17. The actual degree of the discount is an issue of some debate. See Bibas, supra
note 15, at 2488-89. It is possible that defendants facing a greater than average sen-
tence (because of their prior record, for example) are more likely to risk going to trial,
thus skewing the numerical data. (I thank Stephanos Bibas for this observation.)
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acquittals.18 In addition, the ratio of dismissals to acquittals in those
districts has been at its highest over the last decade.19 The lower
acquittal rate on its own could be the result of better prosecutorial
screening and investigation. But if that were the case, we would ex-
pect the rate of dismissals to fall at a similar rate. Given the high
ratio of dismissals to acquittals, the explanation likely lies elsewhere.
As Ronald Wright argues, the data suggest that defendants are prob-
ably abandoning meritorious trial defenses because of the steep sen-
tence discount they receive for pleading guilty. 20
The lack of transparency in plea bargaining makes it very diffi-
cult to detect undue coercion in a particular case. Plea negotiations
occur privately between the prosecutor and the defense attorney. At
least partly as a result of the sentencing structure discussed above,
prosecutors usually have the upper hand in these discussions. Some
prosecutors offer substantially higher plea discounts to defendants
with a good chance of acquittal to convince them to waive their right
to trial. 21 They may also pressure defendants to plead guilty by exag-
gerating the strength of the evidence and threatening harsher treat-
ment to the defendant or his family. 2 2 Yet there is no external
oversight of these negotiations up until the plea colloquy, during
which the judge simply asks the defendant whether his plea is volun-
tary. The post-hoc inquiry into voluntariness is fairly perfunctory
and ineffective. Because the parties have already reached an agree-
ment, the judge is unlikely to discern whether the defendant was un-
duly induced into that agreement. It is difficult to infer coercion
circumstantially. Courts have refused to hold that enormous sen-
tence discounts are sufficient evidence of coercion. 23 And the volun-
18. Wright, supra note 14, at 85-86. The increased guilty plea rates in the last
twenty-five years have displaced acquittals at a higher rate than dismissals or trial
convictions. Id. at 104-06.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 85-86.
21. Albert Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652,
714-15 (1981).
22. E.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998) (prosecutor failed
to disclose exculpatory DNA evidence during plea negotiations); Miller v. Angliker,848 F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (2d Cir. 1988) (prosecution withheld information that indi-
cated that another person had committed the offenses with which defendant was
charged); Sloan v. Estelle, 710 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1983) (prosecutor threatened to seek
the death penalty if the defendant refused the plea bargain); United States v. Whalen,976 F.2d 1346, 1348 (10th Cir.1992) (prosecutor threatened to prosecute the defen-
dant's wife if the defendant refused to plead guilty); United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d
491 (10th Cir. 1994) (government threatened to indict several members of the defen-
dant's family if he did not agree to plead guilty); Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's
Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 62-64, 107-08 (1968); Russell L. Chris-
topher, The Prosecutor's Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
93, 108-09 (2003).
23. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790, 792, 794-95 (1970); Aranda v. Rocha, 58 Fed. Appx. 767, 768 (9th Cir. Mar.
20, 2003); United States v. Hyden, 1997 WL 130376 at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 1997).
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tariness inquiry is not meant to be an assessment of the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. It is merely supposed to determine
whether the plea "represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action available to the defendant."24
This minimal and belated judicial involvement in plea bargaining has
left us without adequate tools to detect undue coercion in individual
cases.
2. Risk of Unfair and Inaccurate Results
A related potential risk of plea bargaining is that it might pro-
duce unfair and inaccurate results. For example, lack of reliable in-
formation about the strength of the evidence and about the expected
post-trial and post-plea sentence could prevent the defendant from
making an intelligent choice to waive his right to trial. The lack of
information, as well as risk-aversion on part of the prosecutor or the
defendant may also produce sentences that are too high or too low
relative to the defendant's blameworthiness. And in most American
jurisdictions today, judges have few tools and only a limited mandate
to remedy inaccuracies and unfairness in guilty plea dispositions.
a. Sentencing Uncertainty
The expectation that plea bargaining produces fair and accurate
results is premised on the notion that the parties have a reasonable
amount of information about the estimated trial disposition and the
range of possible plea outcomes. Until recently, the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines provided relatively good indication of the expected trial
sentences and plea discounts. But after United States v. Booker,
which declared the federal sentencing guidelines to be advisory, the
trial sentence and the plea discount are more difficult to estimate.25
It may be, therefore, that Booker has increased the chances that ei-
ther a prosecutor or a defendant would agree to plea terms that do
not correspond to the true risks of trial.
Both the defense attorney and the prosecutor must calculate in
the course of negotiating a plea whether the final agreement will be
acceptable to the judge and, if not, to what extent the judge might
depart from the agreed-upon sentence. Under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judge may either reject a plea bargain
altogether or accept the bargain, but refuse to impose the sentence
proposed by the parties. 26 The judge's decision to reject a plea under
24. G. NIcHoLAs HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 178 (2d ed. 2004); see also Parke v.
Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992).
25. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
26. Rule 11(e) provides for three types of agreements. The parties may agree that
in exchange for a plea, the prosecutor will do one of the following: (A) move for the
dismissal of other charges; (B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the
defendant's request, for a particular sentence; or (C) agree to a specific sentence. If
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Rule 11 is limited only by review for abuse of discretion. 27 Because
judges have broad discretion to reject pleas or impose a different post-
plea sentence under Rule 11, the defense and the prosecution have
long contended with a level of uncertainty in plea bargaining. 28
Until recently, the federal sentencing guidelines reduced this un-
certainty by limiting judicial discretion in sentencing both after a
plea and after trial. Unless the judge imposed a relevant conduct en-
hancement or granted a substantial assistance motion by the prose-
cution, the guidelines gave the parties a fairly clear understanding of
the potential sentence they were facing. But in the wake of Booker,
the uncertainty following a rejected plea bargain has increased again.
Judges are free to choose from a wider array of factors in departing
from the guidelines, and only a requirement of reasonableness limits
their discretion. As a result, both the post-plea and post-trial
sentences are less predictable.
Some commentators have argued that Booker is unlikely to
change sentencing practices greatly. Many of the currently serving
judges have never sentenced without the guidelines, so their concep-
tion of appropriate sentence is likely to be shaped largely by the
guidelines. Indeed, the data on federal sentencing after Booker sug-
gests that judges continue to follow the guidelines in most cases.29
Departures occur in more than a third of cases, however, and the
number of departures has been growing.s0 It would not be surprising
the agreement is of Type A or C, the court may, in its discretion, reject the agreement
or defer decision until it has considered the pre-sentencing report. In a Type B agree-
ment, which merely requires the prosecutor to recommend or not to oppose the defen-
dant's request for a particular sentence, the parties' recommendation is not binding
on the court.
27. Some appellate courts have even affirmed a plea rejection where the judge has
failed to state a specific reason for the decision. United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d
42, 45 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Foy, 28 F.3d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1994). But see
United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 453 (7th Cir. 1998).
28. A 1985 study found that only about two percent of guilty pleas were rejected
by judges. WILLIAM F. McDONALD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL
ISSUES AND COMMON PRACTICES 135 (1985). But the low level of outright rejection of
pleas may simply reflect the prevalence of Rule 11(e)(B) bargains, which are "mere
recommendations," not agreements to a specific sentence. See Shayna M. Sigman,Comment, An Analysis of Rule 11 Plea Bargain Options, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1319(1999) (explaining why judges prefer Type B bargains). The refusal to follow a sen-
tence recommendation would not be considered a "rejection" of the agreement, yet it
still disrupts the parties' expectations by imposing a different sentence from the one
to which they have agreed.
29. Memorandum from Linda Drazga Maxfield, Office of Policy Analysis, U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n, to Judge Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Numbers on
Post-Booker Sentencing: Data Extract on Apr. 5, 2005, at http://www.ussc.gov/
Blakely/booker_041305.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2005) (finding that 61.4 percent of
federal sentences after Booker are within the guidelines range, a small drop from the
65 percent of sentences within the guidelines in 2002, before Booker).
30. The Commission's Memorandum in March shows a departure rate of 37.4 per-
cent, an increase from the 34.4 percent reported in February 2005. But it is impor-
tant to note that these numbers are still fairly close to the departure rate prior to
Booker and prior to the PROTECT Act, which sharply limited departure grounds. In
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to see the rate of departures continue to increase as judges become
more confident about their new discretion. 3 This is especially likely
since Booker also loosened the standard of review for departures from
the guidelines. Even if a sentence is outside the guideline range, it
may be upheld as "reasonable" under the new standard of review, as
long as the judge "had something to say" about why the departure
was warranted.32
Defendants and prosecutors alike will suffer the effects of greater
uncertainty. Defense lawyers will be less able to advise a client what
post-trial and post-plea sentences would be acceptable to a judge in a
particular case. Prosecutors will also have difficulty making sentenc-
ing predictions and bargaining accordingly. Yet the prohibition on
judicial participation in plea negotiations only compounds this unpre-
dictability. As one defense attorney remarked in response to Booker,
"[Iln a world where judges are for the most part precluded from get-
ting involved in plea negotiations [by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure] the guidelines gave practitioners the ability to
grab a hold, to some degree, of where a client would end up. It made it
easier to counsel a client and navigate a case."33 After Booker, that
sentencing compass is no longer as useful.
Some defendants, especially those who are risk-averse, are likely
to settle for a bad plea bargain to avoid the danger that a judge might
impose a much harsher sentence after trial.34 Prosecutors, too, may
accept plea terms that do not correspond to the facts of the case, if
they miscalculate the likely post-trial sentence or misjudge what plea
terms would be acceptable to the judge. Negotiated sentences may be
too high or too low because of the parties' inability to determine what
the trial system deems an appropriate sentence for a particular case.
Finally, unpredictability reduces the efficiency of plea bargain-
ing. The defendant and the prosecutor, as well as society at large,
incur financial and opportunity costs when the parties are sent back
to the negotiating table by a judge who refuses to accept their sen-
2002, 35 percent of sentences were outside the guidelines range. See U.S. SENTENC-
ING COMM'N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTIcs fig. G (2002),
available at http://www.usse.gov/ANNRPT/2002/fig-g.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
31. E.g., United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005); United
States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D. Me. 2005); United States v. Kuhn, 351 F. Supp.
2d 696 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
32. Marcia Coyle, Federal Appeals Courts May Now Hold Key to Sentencing, RE-
CORDER, Jan. 21, 2005, at 3 (quoting Susan Herman, Professor, Brooklyn Law School);
see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 312 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in
part) ("'[Ulnreasonableness' review will produce a discordant symphony of different
standards, varying from court to court and judge to judge . . . .").
33. Defending Clients Without the Guidelines, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 2005, at 2.
34. This is problematic because the suspects who are most likely to be risk-averse
are also those "with the most self-control, who are least likely to recidivate and thus
need punishment the least." Bibas, supra note 15, at 2509. Innocent people are also
generally more risk averse than criminals. Id.
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tence-specific bargain. More resources are spent on an increasing
number of appeals by defendants and prosecutors whose sentence
proposals have been rejected by the judge. And overconfident defend-
ants reject a greater number of reasonable pleas under the mistaken
view that they would get a better outcome at trial.35
b. Limited Defense Investigation
The adversarial system assigns a primary role to defense counsel
to ensure that large sentence discounts and the uncertainty of the
trial outcome do not distort the defendant's choice whether and on
what terms to plead guilty. A good defense attorney could educate
the defendant about the trial odds and the likely sentence upon a
guilty plea or conviction. And where the prosecution attempts to
pressure the defendant into a guilty plea despite weak evidence of
guilt, the defense attorney could counter with an informed analysis of
the strengths of the case. But counsel cannot always fulfill that role,
in part because of overwhelming caseloads and cuts in indigent de-
fense funding, and in part because of rules that hinder a thorough
investigation by the defense.
Although courts have generally recognized the importance of
competent defense counsel to ensure accurate fact-finding and fair
outcomes, 36 legislatures have consistently underfunded defender ser-
vices. 37 Public and appointed defense attorneys are commonly han-
dling too many cases to devote sufficient attention to each one. State
funding for defense investigations is also too limited.38 Not surpris-
ingly, studies show that defense attorneys interview witnesses very
rarely and hire experts only in exceptional circumstances. 39
Even where funding is not lacking, current rules give the defense
few tools to conduct an adequate investigation. Defense attorneys
lack search and subpoena powers, and in most states, cannot depose
witnesses before trials. 40 Pre-plea discovery is also very limited. The
prosecution has a constitutional duty to disclose at most evidence
that is materially exculpatory and relates to factual innocence.4 1 Tm-
35. Id. at 2503.
36. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344-45 (1963).
37. Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1585, 1590 (2005).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1602-03 (citing several studies, including one showing that New York
City defense attorneys interviewed witnesses in four percent of non-homicide felony
cases and 21 percent of homicides and that they hired experts in two percent of felony
cases and 17 percent of homicides).
40. See id. at 1601. But see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a)(1)(ii) (providing for pretrial
depositions by the defense).
41. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). The Supreme Court left unsettled
the question whether information related to factual innocence ought to be disclosed in
plea negotiations before trial, though some lower courts have required such disclo-
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peachment evidence, which is often key to the defense's ability to un-
cover flaws and inaccuracies in the government's case, need not be
disclosed prior to plea negotiations. 42 At the federal level, Rule 16
provides for additional disclosure of items material to the preparation
of the defense, even if they are not exculpatory. But this information
does not extend to witness names and statements, or to materials
relevant to sentencing.43 Some prosecutors follow the recommenda-
tion of the federal sentencing and prosecutorial guidelines and dis-
close to the defense all sentencing-related facts.44 Others, however,
disclose such information only after the pre-sentencing report has
been prepared, long after plea bargaining has ended. 45 Courts have
approved the practice of providing sentence-related information just
before sentencing, rather than before the plea colloquy.46
Various incentives for the defendant to plead guilty as early as
possible further discourage a thorough investigation by the defense.
Current charging practices, for example, promote early plea negotia-
tions. Justice Department policies allow prosecutors to bring addi-
tional charges for "tactical advantages" in presenting "the strongest
case possible."47 Defense involvement in plea discussions before the
defendant is charged or shortly thereafter is critical to preventing
overcharging and avoiding mandatory minimum sentences. 48 The
U.S. Attorneys' Manual also states explicitly that prosecutors "should
make it clear to defense counsel at an early stage of the proceeding
that, if there are to be any plea discussions, they must be concluded
prior to a certain date well in advance of the trial date."49
Indeed, the "timeliness of the defendant's conduct in manifesting
the acceptance of responsibility" is a key factor in determining
whether a defendant is entitled to a sentencing discount.50 Courts
have been reluctant to grant an "acceptance of responsibility" dis-
count where defendants pled guilty close to trial.5' Timeliness is par-
sure. Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995); Ferrara v. United
States, 384 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Mass. 2005).
42. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622.
43. States vary widely in their discovery rules, but the denial of discovery of wit-
ness statements is common. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 987-88 (7th ed. 2004).
44. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2 cmt.; U.S. ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL § 9-27.750.
45. HERMAN, supra note 24, at 151.
46. E.g., United States v. Brewster, 1 F.3d 51, 53 (1st Cir. 1993).
47. HERMAN, supra note 24, at 114.
48. Id.
49. U.S. ArrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.420 cmt.B(5) (emphasis added).
50. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3E.1.1 cmt., app. 1; 6B1.2 cmt.
51. United States v. Curtis, 934 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hill,
953 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1991). But see United States v. Kimpel, 27 F.3d 1409 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that it is improper to deny a defendant benefits of acceptance of re-
sponsibility simply because that acceptance was delayed by the defendant's exercise
of his constitutional right to pretrial investigation and discovery).
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ticularly important where the defendant hopes for a three-level
rather than a two-level reduction of his sentence under the guide-
lines. To qualify for the additional reduction, "the defendant must
have notified authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty at a
sufficiently early point in the process so that the government may
avoid preparing for trial and the court may schedule its calendar effi-
ciently."52 Courts have accordingly refrained from granting the dis-
count unless the defendant has pled guilty early enough "to prevent
the government from engaging in needless trial preparation and to
give the overburdened trial courts an opportunity to allocate their
limited resources in the most efficient manner."53 While the desire to
save the burden and expense of trial preparation may be understand-
able, early plea negotiations pose the risk that the true strengths and
weaknesses of a case will not be known.
c. After-the-Fact Judicial Review of the Plea
Even if negotiations between the parties fail to produce a fair
and accurate plea bargain, judges have the power to reject the plea.
In most jurisdictions, judges have the responsibility to determine, at
the plea colloquy stage, whether the plea is voluntary, knowing, and
has a solid factual basis. 54 Yet it is questionable whether this proce-
dural safeguard is effective. In part, this is because the standard for
finding that the plea is factually based is very low. And even when
judges conscientiously seek to scrutinize the basis for the plea, this
post-hoc review is difficult to perform. The parties have already
agreed on the terms of a plea bargain and have little interest in re-
vealing anything to the judge that might disturb the agreement.
At present, the factual basis inquiry into the plea is often per-
functory. One court has defined the standard of proof as "sufficient
evidence at the time of the plea upon which the court may reasonably
determine that the defendant likely committed the offense."55 Others
have simply required "some factual basis."56 Mere admissions of
guilt by the defendant are often sufficient to support a guilty plea.5 7
Many courts have allowed judges to read the indictment to the defen-
52. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E.1.1(b)(2) cmt., app. 6. The PRO-
TECT Act of 2003 amended this provision to require that the additional level be
granted upon motion by the prosecutor.
53. United States v. Francis, 39 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 1994) (additional level
reduction denied despite early notice of intent to plead guilty, where defendants failed
to plead guilty until close to one week before trial); United States v. Sowemimo, 335
F.3d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 2003).
54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
55. United States v. Marks, 38 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir.1994).
56. United States v. Fountain, 777 F.2d 351, 357 (7th Cir.1985).
57. United States v. Deal, 678 F.2d 1062, 1067 (11th Cir.1982) (factual basis was
established when the defendant twice admitted in court to knowing that goods trans-
ported across state line were stolen).
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dant and then merely to inquire whether he committed the acts in
question.58 In other courts, the prosecutor's summary of the evi-
dence59 or submission of a probable cause affidavit60 is enough. Fur-
thermore, Rule 11 requires judges to examine only "facts necessary to
support the elements of the underlying criminal charge." 61 This
means that inquiry into non-essential factual allegations, which may
be highly relevant to sentencing, rarely happens at the plea colloquy.
Finally, even in cases of so-called Alford pleas, 62 where a defendant
pleads guilty while protesting his innocence, the factual basis for the
plea need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.63 Rather, the
standard of proof is something closer to a "high probability of
conviction."64
The delayed and relatively minimal involvement of the judge in
the plea bargaining process means that the plea terms may not re-
flect the true facts of the offense. As part of the plea bargain, the
parties often stipulate to the facts relevant to sentencing. Defend-
ants in some jurisdictions may plead to hypothetical crimes,65 or to
real crimes they did not commit.6 6 And especially in systems with
mandatory sentencing guidelines, the parties may engage in fact bar-
gaining to achieve a desired sentencing outcome.67 Judges rarely
overturn such stipulations.68 Because of this minimal supervision by
the judge, the parties may reach plea bargains that are both inaccu-
rate and unfair.
C. Reconsidering Judicial Involvement in Plea Negotiations
As a result of judicial passivity in the plea negotiations, prosecu-
tors largely dictate the plea terms. As one federal judge has ob-
58. E.g., Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 415-16 (3d Cir. 1973); see also
United States v. Guichard, 779 F.2d 1139, 1146 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that a guilty
plea was properly accepted where the defendant agreed to and signed a recitation of
events); State v. Campbell, 488 P.2d 968 (Ariz. 1971).
59. John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EmoRy L.J. 437, 473-74 (2001).
60. Interview with Attorneys # 1 and # 2, State Attorney's Office, 17th Jud. Cir.,
Florida, Mar. 14, 2005.
61. Scott Moore, Comment, Re-Examining the Admissive Effect of Guilty Pleas at
Sentencing, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 463, 475.
62. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
63. United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 111-12 (6th Cir.1995) ("[S]trong evi-
dence of actual guilt is not necessary to satisfy Rule 11(f), even where a defendant
protests his innocence.").
64. John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas:
Voluntary Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 88, 126 (1977).
65. People v. Foster, 225 N.E.2d 200 (N.Y. 1967) (allowing a plea to attempted
manslaughter in the second degree, a legally impossible offense).
66. Barkai, supra note 64, at 116-17.
67. See Symposium, Assessing the Probation Officers' Survey: Does Fact Bargain-
ing Undermine the Sentencing Guidelines?, 8 FED. SENT. REP. 299 (1996).
68. United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1033-34 (2d Cir. 1991); HERMAN,
supra note 24, at 126.
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served, "The prosecutor . . . is the central adjudicator of facts ([and]
arbiter of most legal issues and of the appropriate sentence to be im-
posed)."69 Our system has already slipped away from the adversarial
model, and has become instead an "administrative system of criminal
justice," managed by the prosecutor's office rather than the courts. 70
It is time to rethink whether this new administrative model, domi-
nated by the prosecutor, is the one most likely to produce fair, accu-
rate and voluntary plea bargains.
As the next three Sections show, there are good reasons, based
on practical experience, to believe that judicial involvement in plea
negotiations is a better way to promote accuracy and fairness in plea
bargaining. A judge who takes part in the negotiations can more eas-
ily detect undue pressures on the defendant to plead guilty. He or
she can also provide a more impartial assessment of the strength of
the case and the post-trial sentence that the defendant will face.
Where a plea disposition does not correspond to the facts of the case,
early involvement by the judge is more likely to uncover the discrep-
ancy. An earlier evaluation of the factual basis by the judge not only
increases the accuracy of plea dispositions, but also reduces the extra
costs of appealing and renegotiating plea terms rejected only at the
plea colloquy.
Active judicial participation in plea negotiations may strike some
as inimical to the adversarial tradition. As Part II discusses, judges
tend to supervise plea negotiations most closely in inquisitorial sys-
tems such as Germany, where they have traditionally played a more
active role in managing criminal proceedings. But the review of the
Florida and Connecticut systems in Part III shows that even some
American states have already adopted judicial participation in a way
that complements party-driven procedures, instead of conflicting
with them. As the next Sections argue, there are many reasons-
based on experience as well as logic-to reconsider our initial skepti-
cism toward judicial management of plea negotiations.
III. THE GERMAN MODEL: THE JUDGE AS PARTY AND SUPERVISOR
A working model of active judicial involvement in plea bargain-
ing is that developed in Germany, where judges act as both a party to
and a supervisor of plea negotiations. This proactive approach is in
large part a function of Germany's inquisitorial tradition, which en-
trusts judges with the primary responsibility to discover and verify
69. Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading
Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1403-04 (2003).
70. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 2117 (1998).
214 [Vol. 54
PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
the substantive truth of the case.71 Active involvement in the plea
negotiations allows judges to fulfill that responsibility in the context
of plea bargaining, and helps ensure that the plea bargains are fair
and consistent with the true facts of the case.
A. Background: The German Model of Criminal Procedure in
Contentious Cases
In order to understand the German practice of plea bargaining, it
is necessary to review some key aspects of German criminal proce-
dure. Germany has a civil-law, inquisitorial criminal justice system,
which traditionally envisions an active role for the judge. One of the
key responsibilities of the court is to uncover the "substantive truth"
of the case. To fulfill that responsibility, judges read the investiga-
tive file containing all the evidence gathered by the government and
at trial conduct further investigation themselves, by questioning wit-
nesses and requesting additional information where necessary. 72
Judges also have substantial control over the charges filed.
When the charges do not adequately reflect the underlying events,
judges can, after giving notice, convict the defendant on different
charges.73 Similarly, judges decide whether charges should be dis-
missed once the formal accusation has been filed, 74 and their ap-
proval is often needed for a prosecutor to decline to file charges.75 In
deciding whether to adjust or dismiss charges, judges can probe into
the relevant facts on their own initiative, going beyond the investiga-
tive file compiled by the police and presented by the prosecution.76
German judges also have broad discretion over the defendant's
sentence. Sentencing and trial form part of a unitary proceeding in
Germany. The court deliberates on punishment and sentence at the
71. The word inquisitorial is somewhat misleading. German criminal procedure
today has many features commonly associated with adversarial systems, such as the
questioning of witnesses by the defense and prosecution. To that extent, the German
system may be better described as mixed. I use the term "inquisitorial" here to de-
scribe a system that emphasizes inquiry and control by judges, rather than by the
parties.
72. StPO (Strafprozessordnung) §§ 214, 238, 241; Richard S. Frase & Thomas
Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar
Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 344-45 (1995).
73. StPO § 265 (judges can substitute charges, but the new charges must be based
on conduct included in the initial accusation).
74. StPO §§ 156; 15311; 153all; 153blI; 15411.
75. In felony cases, prosecution is mandatory unless the evidence is insufficient to
support the charges. In less serious cases, the prosecution can decide not to file
charges for several specified policy reasons, but to do so, it still needs the court's con-
sent. StPO §§ 153, 153a, 153b. But see § 1531 (no court consent needed for less serious
crimes where culpability is minor); 153c (same for offenses abroad); § 153d (political
offenses); § 153f (universal jurisdiction offenses), § 1541 (collateral charges).
76. Email from Thomas Weigend, Professor of Law, Institute for Comparative and
International Law, University of Cologne, Germany, to author, Sept. 14, 2005 [herein-
after Weigend E-mail # 1].
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same time, and in the mixed court, which hears more serious crimi-
nal cases, lay and professional judges deliberate together.77 At the
end of trial, the judgment must describe in detail "how [the court]
evaluates the evidence and which facts it finds to be true."78 It must
also provide reasons for the punishment imposed, but the law im-
poses relatively few limits on the court's sentencing discretion.
The German Criminal Code generally provides a maximum and
sometimes a minimum sentence for each offense. At times, it also
indicates distinct sentencing ranges for less serious or more serious
instances of the offense.79 The Code includes certain aggravating
sentencing factors as offense elements-for example, selling or traf-
ficking a "not insignificant amount" of drugs, acting as a member of a
criminal gang, or committing a crime by use of weapons.80 Other fac-
tors considered at sentencing include the motive and state of mind of
the perpetrator, prior criminal history, and whether the perpetrator
has tried to reconcile with the victim or has provided restitution.8 '
What weight should be attached to each of these factors is not
clear. Judges have considerable discretion in deciding how much each
factor will count at sentencing.82 As long as the trial court addresses
the relevant factors in a reasoned opinion, the appellate courts are
unlikely to intervene.83 At the same time, following the principle
that the sentence must be proportionate to the defendant's guilt, the
77. A brief description of German criminal courts' jurisdiction is warranted here:
"Both misdemeanors and petty infractions .. . are tried in county court (Amtsgericht),
either by a single professional judge . . . , or, if the case concerns a more serious
offense, by a mixed court (Schoffengericht) consisting of one professional and two lay
judges. Felonies can also be tried in the Schiffengericht, but serious felony cases are
tried in district court (Landgericht) before a different mixed panel composed of two or
three professional and two lay judges (Grosse Strafkammer)... . To some extent, juris-
diction depends on the prosecutor's choice which, in turn, is informed by the penalty
expected in the particular case." Frase & Weigend, supra note 72, at 321 (citations
omitted).
78. StPO § 267, cited in Frase & Weigend, supra note 72, at 344.
79. Cornelius Nestler, Sentencing in Germany, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 112
(2004) (citing StGB § 224, which establishes two sentencing ranges-in cases of dan-
gerous bodily injury, between six months to ten years, and in less serious cases of the
same offense, three months to five years). In some cases, the Code provides only a
minimum sentence, but the maximum prison sentence is set at 15 years, with the only
longer sentence, life imprisonment, available in cases of murder.
80. E.g., BtMG (Betiubungsmittelgesetz) § 29(a)(2) (more than an insignificant
amount of drugs); StGB (Strafgesetzbuch) § 244 (2) (theft as a member of a gang);
StGB § 244 (1) (armed theft).
81. StGB § 46.
82. Interview # 24, Landgericht Judge, Berlin ("Precise sentencing is voodoo.
There are no mathematical rules. We just compare to other cases.").
83. See, e.g., Interview # 5, Prosecutor, Bonn (appellate courts would not inter-
vene unless the sentence is clearly disproportionate to the defendant's guilt); Inter-
view # 10, Landgericht Judge, Berlin ("The BGH jurisprudence is not very helpful in
guiding us, because the range is so wide .... I am surprised that the BGH upholds




Federal Supreme Court 84 has recently become more active in revers-
ing sentences that it finds unduly severe or lenient.8 5 As plea bar-
gaining has spread in Germany, appellate courts have become
particularly concerned that negotiated sentences might be dispropor-
tionate to defendants' culpability. The Federal Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized that sentences must be neither too lenient as
a result of a plea bargain, nor too severe where plea negotiations
have failed.86
B. How German Plea Bargaining Works: Theory and Practice
As late as 1979, Germany could still be called a "land without
plea bargaining."87 Over the past 25 years, however, plea bargaining
has grown rapidly in Germany, largely unnoticed at first and much
more openly since the 1990s. While a 1986 study found that plea bar-
gaining occurred almost exclusively in white-collar and drug cases,8 8
today it also happens frequently in sexual violence, organized crime,
and corruption cases, and less often in homicide cases.89
The practice of plea bargaining in Germany developed organi-
cally, without direction from any written rule change or centrally es-
tablished policy. Judges and prosecutors were looking to save time
and resources as their caseloads grew and became more complex, and
defendants were looking for more certainty and a sentence reduction
for their cooperation. In the absence of legislative guidance, trial
judges were relatively free to define their own role in the process.
The higher courts stepped in occasionally, but even when they did so,
they established only very broad limits on plea negotiations.9 0
As in the United States, plea negotiations in Germany may con-
cern either the underlying charges or the sentence, or both. But Ger-
84. The Federal Supreme Court, Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), is the highest court of
appeals for criminal cases, unless a constitutional issue is involved, in which case the
defendant can petition the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Constitutional Court.
85. Weigend E-mail # 1 (referring to § 46 I 1 StGB and TRONDLE/ FISCHER,
STRAFGESETZBUCH § 46 n.109 (2004)); Interview # 32, Amtsgericht Judge, Cologne.
86. BGH GSSt 1/04, NJW 1440/05, Beschluss v. 3.3.2005; see also BGH 4 StR 240/
97, Urteil v. 28.8.1997 (noting that negotiated confessions should not be rewarded
with a discount that is disproportionate to the defendant's guilt); BGH 1 StR 171/02,
Beshluss v. 11.09.2002 (same); BGH 4 StR 371/03, Urteil v. 19.2.2004 (noting that the
judge should not impose a disproportionately heavy sentence in retaliation for the
defendant's failure to comply with certain conditions of the plea bargain).
87. John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78
MICH. L. REV. 204 (1979).
88. Raimund Hassemer & Gabriele Hippler, Informelle Absprachen in der Praxis
des deutschen Strafterfahrens, StV 8 (1986) 360, 361.
89. E.g., Interview # 15, Landgericht Judge, Leipzig (common in organized crime
and sexual crimes, but rarer in homicide cases); Interview # 9, Landgericht Judge,
Cologne (common in all cases, but more frequent in white-collar crime and drug cases
and rarer in assault and homicide cases).
90. BGHSt 43, 195, 202 ff., 4 StR 240/97; BGH GSSt 1/04, NJW 2005, 1440,
Beschluss v. 3.3.2005.
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man prosecutors' discretion to bargain is narrower than that of their
American counterparts. The German Criminal Procedure Code lim-
its the extent to which prosecutors can decline to file charges. Felony
charges must be filed if there is an adequate evidentiary basis.91
Once the trial begins, the prosecution cannot withdraw the indict-
ment or reduce the charges; it is the court's prerogative to do so. 9 2 In
addition to having control over the charges that the prosecution
brings, judges have very broad discretion over sentencing. Conse-
quently, prosecutors cannot make credible commitments that the
court will accept a particular charge or sentence bargain. That is one
of the main reasons why plea negotiations in Germany involve judges
to a much greater degree than in the United States.
In misdemeanor and other less serious cases, German prosecu-
tors have greater discretion to refrain from filing charges.93 Not sur-
prisingly, that is where they are most likely to engage in bargaining
without directly involving the court. 94 Most common is bargaining
under Section 153a of the Criminal Procedure Code, which allows
prosecutors to decline to file charges on certain conditions-for exam-
ple, when the defendant pays restitution or makes a contribution to a
charity.95 Although § 153a applies to crimes carrying a minimum
sentence of less than one year in prison, most assault and theft cases,
as well as a number of white-collar crimes, fall in that category. In
practice, the parties sometimes agree to a dismissal under § 153a
even for more serious crimes.96 While § 153a was enacted to divert
minor infractions away from the criminal justice system, today it is
often used to dispose of more serious offenses that are too complex
and burdensome to resolve through ordinary trial proceedings.9 7
Two white-collar crime defense attorneys in Cologne claim that they
91. StPO § 170 (1).
92. StPO §§ 156, 15411 (court may do so upon application by the prosecution),
15311 (court may do so with the consent of the prosecution and the defense).
93. StPO §§ 153 (1), 153a. Although court consent is required for terminations
under § 153a and terminations of more serious cases under § 153, in practice, ap-
proval is rarely withheld. E.g., Interview # 3, Defense Attorney, Cologne (noting that
rejection is "very, very rare"); Interview # 14, Prosecutor, Munich.
94. Prosecutors have several other important sources of discretion that give rise
to bargaining-for example, whether to file a case in lower or higher court and what
detention and parole conditions to recommend to the trial court or the Corrections
Court (Vollstreckungskammer), respectively. But such bargaining is less common, so
it will not be discussed here.
95. StPO § 153 (a) (1). Other conditions include paying compensation to the vic-
tim, performing charitable works, or undertaking specific support obligations. Prose-
cutors decline to file charges under § 153 (a) in about seven percent of cases.
STATISTIISCHEs BUNDESAMT, FACHSERIE 10, REIHE 2, GERICHTE UND STAATSANWALT-
SCHAFTEN 140 (2001).
96. BERND SCHONEMANN, ABSPRACHEN IM STRAFVERFAHREN? GRUNDLAGEN,
GEGENSTANDEN UND GRENZEN B19 (1990); Hassemer & Hippler, supra note 88, at 363.
97. SCHONEMANN, supra note 96, at B19; Joachim Herrmann, Bargaining Justice
- A Bargain for German Criminal Justice?, 53 U. PrrT. L. REV. 755, 759 (1992).
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settle close to half of their cases through bargaining under § 153a.9 8
This bargaining occurs without any active involvement by the
judge.99 The prosecutor obtains the judge's approval only after the
parties have bargained and reached an agreement on their own.100
While in minor cases, the defense may negotiate with the prose-
cutor before the charges are filed, in more serious cases, both charge
bargaining and sentence bargaining involve the court and take place
after the charges are filed. Charge bargaining with the court occurs
when evidence on some counts proves less convincing than antici-
pated by the prosecution,' 0 or when the case is very complex and
contains a number of repetitive offenses. 102 In the latter case, the
court may dismiss a number of charges so as not to waste time in
reviewing each individual count of the accusation. 103 Where charges
are dismissed purely for administrative efficiency, the defendant's
sentence may not be reduced or at least not by much.104 On the other
hand, where charges are dismissed because some counts cannot be
proven, the defendant usually receives a reduced sentence.105
The court is even more involved in sentence bargaining, a prac-
tice that is on the rise in Germany. Although no statutory provision
authorizes it, it has spread widely because it offers distinct advan-
tages to all involved. In return for a reduced sentence and perhaps
better detention conditions,106 the defendant can offer several bene-
fits to the court and prosecution. First, he may provide a confession
made on the record in court. (Neither the Code nor German language
recognizes the concept of a "guilty plea.") The confession is often
rather summary, but it is valuable to the court and prosecution be-
cause it largely obviates the need for further evidence gathering and
saves time. In complicated white-collar crime cases or in organized
crime cases with international dimensions, a confession may reduce
98. Interview # 4, Defense Attorney, Cologne; Interview # 3, Defense Attorney,
Cologne.
99. Interview # 4, Defense Attorney, Cologne.
100. Id.
101. Hassemer & Hippler, supra note 88, at 363.
102. E.g., Interview # 21, Landgericht Judge, Munich; Interview # 32, Amtsgericht
Judge, Cologne.
103. StPO § 154.
104. E.g., Interview # 21, Landgericht Judge, Munich; Interview # 32, Amtsgericht
Judge, Cologne; Interview # 5, Prosecutor, Bonn.
105. Interview # 15, Landgericht Judge, Leipzig (giving as an example a case
where the defendant was indicted on 1,080 counts of drug-dealing: "A large part of the
indictment could not be proven because of the lack of credibility of some of the wit-
nesses who were drug addicts . . .. The defense said that the defendant would confess
to a number of the charges-about 400, and also would give information about the
origin and transportation of the drugs; the prosecution agreed that on these condi-
tions, it was prepared to drop the other counts under Section 154, and then we agreed
relatively easily on a sentence of six years.").
106. See infra note 141.
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the length of trial from weeks or months to just several hours. 10 7 In
sexual violence cases, it can also spare a victim the trauma of testify-
ing. 08 The defense may also agree to refrain from filing further mo-
tions-a concession that saves the court valuable time.' 09
Furthermore, the defendant and the prosecutor may waive their
right to appeal. This allows the court to write a shorter judgment" 0
and protects the plea deal from challenges. And finally, in drug-re-
lated prosecutions, the defendant may offer his cooperation with
other investigations, in return for a promise by the prosecutor to rec-
ommend a more lenient sentence to the court."'
Sentence bargaining is most commonly initiated by the defense
attorney, though judges are also likely to start the discussions.112
The plea discussions usually occur in the judge's chambers or in a
courthouse conference room. The negotiations at this point include
the defense attorney, the prosecutor and at least one judge. In Lan-
dgericht, a felony court composed of two or three professional and two
lay judges, the negotiations could involve either just the presiding
judge, or the presiding judge and the judge responsible for drafting
the court's judgment, or sometimes all three professional judges."13
The lay judges are usually absent from the initial negotiations, as
they are not yet empanelled at that point. The defendant is also not
present-the defense attorney consults with him or her before and
after the plea discussions.
The outcome of the negotiations is later entered into the trial re-
cord, as required by the Federal Supreme Court.114 As one Berlin
Landgericht judge explained: "[W]e enter a notation to the effect that
we had met and what the outcome of the conversations was. There is
no protocol of the entire discussion. Who made what proposals-that
107. Herrmann, supra note 97, at 763.
108. Although this is true in various cases, German courts have been most recep-
tive to this argument in sexual violence prosecutions, particularly where the victim is
a child.
109. E.g., Interview # 9, Landgericht Judge, Cologne.
110. Writing a full judgment is a very time-consuming task for German courts.
StPO § 267; Email from Thomas Weigend, Professor of Law, Institute for Compara-
tive and International Law, University of Cologne, Germany, to author, Jan. 16, 2006
[hereinafter Weigend E-mail # 2].
111. BtMG § 31.
112. Wolfgang Pfister, Die Verstindigung im Strafoerfahren, DRiZ, Juni 2004, at
179; see also Interview # 5, Prosecutor, Bonn (judges often initiate negotiations be-
cause they are overburdened). It is rare for a prosecutor to take the initiative. E.g.,
Interview # 9, Landgericht Judge, Cologne.
113. In the past, negotiations often included only the judge and defense counsel, so
the Federal Supreme Court stepped in to ensure that prosecutors are included as
well. BGHSt 43, 195, 202, 4 StR 240/97 (1997).
114. In fact, the Federal Supreme Court requires that the "substance" of the nego-
tiations be entered into the record, which may require more than an announcement of




would not be included."115 Even this minimal requirement of record-
keeping is not followed scrupulously. One defense attorney sug-
gested that in Amtsgericht, a county court that handles less serious
offenses,"16 the existence of a plea bargain might not be entered into
the record.' 17
Because negotiations occur off-the-record in Germany, public
scrutiny of the process is largely limited to the participation of lay
judges in the final sentence deliberations."18 But even their role is
rather minimal. Once the protocol is read out in public and the de-
fendant confesses to the crime as agreed, the professional judges re-
tire back to a conference with their two lay colleagues. Usually, it is
during this conference that the lay judges first hear about the plea
discussions. They rarely play a role in the negotiations because they
are not empanelled until the main proceedings begin."19 Moreover,
unlike the professional judges, they are not allowed to review the
case file.120 They have to rely on the professional judges' representa-
tion of the facts to make their decision, so they are easily swayed by
the judges' opinion. While some professional judges are more solici-
tous of the laypersons' opinions on the plea negotiations and the re-
sult reached,121 others simply tell them the outcome and ask for their
consent.12 2 For all of these reasons, lay judges influence the verdict
and sentence in negotiated cases only in the most exceptional
circumstances.1 2 3
The transparency of the process is further reduced because judg-
ments after a plea bargain are likely to be much shorter than in a
case that has been fully tried.124 This is especially true where the
defendant has waived the right to appeal the judgment.125 In most
115. Interview # 10, Landgericht Judge, Berlin; see also Interview # 8, Prosecutor,
Mannheim.
116. See supra note 77.
117. Remark by Defense Attorney, in Interview # 32, Amtsgericht Judge, Cologne.
118. For a brief review of the role of German lay judges during trial and sentenc-
ing, see Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311,
374-75 (2003).
119. E.g., Interview # 15, Landgericht Judge, Leipzig.
120. Id.
121. Interview # 10, Landgericht Judge, Berlin.
122. Id. The lay judges formally have a veto power over certain decisions. Profes-
sional judges need the vote of at least one lay judge for any decision disadvantaging
the defendant in the Landgericht's Grand Chamber (Grosse Strafkammer), which
tries more serious felony cases, and for all decisions-advantageous or not-in the
Amtsgericht's mixed court (Schoffengericht), which tries less serious offenses. StPO
§ 263. In reality, however, all of my interviewees stated that lay judges follow the
suggestions of the professional judges in all but the most exceptional cases.
123. E.g., Interview # 32, Amtsgericht Judge, Cologne; Interview # 15, Landgericht
Judge, Leipzig.
124. Interview # 4, Defense Attorney, Cologne.
125. Id.
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cases, such a waiver is an implicit part of the plea bargain. 126 It is
rarely stated expressly, however, because the case law forbids judges
to discuss appellate waivers in connection with a plea deal. 127 The
parties can discuss such waivers in an informal manner, without the
court's involvement. While this informal agreement has no binding
force, the attorneys, who are usually repeat players in the local crimi-
nal justice system, have no interest in upsetting the deal by filing an
appeal. Waivers therefore regularly accompany plea bargains.
Case law further provides that judges cannot promise to impose
a specific sentence during the negotiations and can only state a cap
beyond which they would not go.1 2 8 The rationale behind this prohi-
bition is that judges should be able to adjust the sentence in light of
additional facts that might be revealed at trial. 129 In reality, the cap
itself may be a signal about the expected sentence, or the judge may
informally note in the negotiations what the expected sentence would
be.13 0 But judges are free to impose a lesser sentence if new material
facts emerge at the main proceeding after the plea negotiations.13 If
the court wishes to go beyond the cap, it must inform the defendant of
its intention and give him the opportunity to adjust his defense.132
This leaves the defendant in an awkward position because a confes-
sion he may already have made in open court cannot be formally
withdrawn and may be used against him.' 33
C. Assessing the German Model: Advantages and Disadvantages
As this brief overview of the plea bargaining process indicates,
German judges are active participants in the plea negotiations, par-
ticularly in more serious cases. Their role has been described as that
of a mediator, a manager, or a supervisor of the negotiations.' 3 4 The
126. E.g., Interview # 27, Prosecutor, Munich; Interview # 21, Landgericht Judge,
Munich. But see Interview # 24, Landgericht Judge, Berlin ("I think the BGH's rule[prohibiting the waiver of appellate remedies] is correct. I never ask for waiver. I
think it is inconsistent with the self-image of a judge. And I operate on the presump-
tion that my judgments are correct anyway."); Interview # 10, Landgericht Judge,Berlin.
127. BGHSt 43, 195, 202 ff., 4 StR 240/97; BGHSt, Anfragebeschl. v. 24.7.2003,
StV 10/2003, 544; BGH GSSt 1/04, NJW 1440/05, Beschluss v. 3.3.2005.
128. BGHSt 43, 195, 202 ff., 4 StR 240/97.
129. Id. In Germany, the proceeding at which the negotiated confession is received
and sentence imposed is Hauptverhandlung, the "main proceeding," which is the
equivalent of trial in the United States.
130. Interview # 17, Landgericht Judge, Hamburg (observing that in about two-
thirds of cases, the sentence cap is also the actual sentence imposed); Interview # 32,Amtsgericht Judge, Cologne.
131. BGH 4 StR 240/97, Urteil v. 28.08.1997.
132. 36 BGHSt 210/83, 214.
133. Pfister, supra note 112, at 181; BGH 3 StR 257/03, Urteil v. 16.10.2003. There
is, however, discussion about introducing an exclusionary rule as to the confession in
this situation. Weigend E-mail # 2.
134. See Langer, From Legal Transplants, supra note 10, at 44-45 (describing two
conflicting conceptions of criminal procedure that shape German judges' role in plea
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Federal Supreme Court treats them as an essential party to the nego-
tiations.135 Whatever the label applied, the advantages and disad-
vantages of the German model are worth evaluating to see what
features of the model could be useful in American plea bargaining
regimes.
1. The Benefits of Certainty
The first advantage of the German model of judicial supervision
is that it offers the parties greater certainty about plea bargaining
outcomes than a system in which the judge passively verifies the plea
after the fact.
As noted earlier, German judges have wide sentencing discre-
tion, and even seasoned attorneys have a difficult time predicting the
sentence in a particular case.136 Because of this uncertainty, parties
often try to talk with judges, even outside the context of plea negotia-
tions, to find out what sentence the court is likely to impose. The
permissibility of ex parte communications in Germany makes the
practice quite common and informal.' 3 7 It seems so common that,
when asked about the frequency of plea bargains, several interview-
ees emphasized a distinction between mere "conversations" with
judges, which happen regularly, and the more involved process of
plea bargaining, which is less common.138 During plea negotiations,
judges are actively involved, openly discussing the merits of the case
and the range of acceptable dispositions.13 9
As expected, many interviewees emphasized that one of the prin-
cipal benefits of plea bargaining is the reduction of risk for the par-
bargaining-the conception of the judge as official investigator and the conception of
the judge as a manager of an assembly line of cases). Compare Interview # 31, De-
fense Attorney, Mannheim (judge is more of a mediator than a supervisor); Interview
# 7, Prosecutor, Mannheim (describing the judges' role in plea bargaining as rather
passive), with Interview # 10, Landgericht Judge, Berlin (asserting that judges act as
supervisors); Interview # 9, Landgericht Judge, Cologne (same); Interview # 13, Pros-
ecutor, Munich (same); Interview # 12, Defense Attorney, Cologne (noting that judges
play a central role, that they do more than mediate, and that their outlook is focused
on leading the proceedings and uncovering the truth).
135. BGHSt 43, 195, 202 ff., 4 StR 240/97; Weigend E-mail # 1.
136. Interview # 27, Prosecutor, Cologne ("We never know what sentence will be
given. When we're appearing before a judge we've dealt with before, we know the
tendencies, but it is only a prognosis. It is particularly hard to predict because the
sentence is a collective decision of the judges and lay judges.").
137. The only limit on ex parte contacts with judges seems to be the judge's duty to
remain free from apparent bias. See § 24 StPO; Weigend E-mail # 1. I witnessed
several such ex parte discussions while I was interviewing judges in Germany. The
judges confirmed that ex parte contacts are a regular element of communications with
the judge. Interview # 32, Amtsgericht Judge, Cologne.
138. E.g., Interview # 15, Landgericht Judge, Leipzig.
139. Id. (adding that it is harder to be as fully open in negotiations with lawyers
that the judge does not know).
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ties. 140 The certainty is especially valuable to defendants in
detention, for whom the bargain might also bring prompt release. 141
While the benefits of certainty accrue most directly to the parties, the
greater predictability of the process is also a societal gain. It reduces
the costs of plea bargaining by minimizing the need for renegotiation
and appeals of failed bargains. 14 2 Because German judges have sub-
stantial control over charging and sentencing decisions, their partici-
pation in the negotiations is essential to reducing uncertainty in the
process.
Predictability may sometimes come into conflict with other im-
portant values of the legal process, and courts play an important role
in resolving that conflict. The debate surrounding negotiated appeals
waivers reflects the tension between predictability and fairness. As
those favoring such waivers emphasize, the certainty of a plea bar-
gain is reduced if the judgment can be appealed. Many German prac-
titioners believe that without the guarantee of finality of the bargain,
plea bargaining would lose its appeal.143 So even while some appel-
late courts had prohibited the parties from agreeing on an appeals
waiver as a condition of the plea bargain, several interviewees admit-
ted to ignoring the prohibition.144
But as other practitioners maintain, the possibility of appellate
review is important to ensuring a plea bargain's fairness. 145 For that
reason, two chambers of the Federal Supreme Court had held that a
waiver of appellate remedies could not be part of the plea bargain;
two others, however, allowed such waivers.146 In March 2005, the
Grand Senate of the Federal Supreme Court issued a new decision,
which resolved the split among the courts. 147 It prohibited judicial
involvement in waiver negotiations, but effectively left the parties
free to negotiate appeals waivers informally between themselves. It
140. E.g., Interview # 32, Amtsgericht Judge, Cologne; Interview # 23, Defense At-
torney, Mannheim.
141. Interview # 15, Landgericht Judge, Leipzig; Interview # 18, Landgericht
Judge, Hamburg. Under BGH case law, release from detention is not supposed to be
subject to bargaining. But several interviewees acknowledged that in practice it is a
common part of the plea bargain. In some states, freedom from detention pending
trial is especially valuable because it means that a defendant would receive "open
imprisonment" upon conviction, which is a much lighter regime of imprisonment than
"closed imprisonment." Weigend E-mail # 1.
142. See Interview # 15, Landgericht Judge, Leipzig (noting that he had not seen
an appeal from a plea bargain, and that the parties are generally satisfied with the
result and do not bring appeals); Interview # 18, Landgericht Judge, Hamburg (ob-
serving that less than ten percent of plea bargains are appealed).
143. Interview # 12, Defense Attorney, Cologne; Interview # 31, Defense Attorney,
Mannheim.
144. E.g., Interview # 31, Defense Attorney, Mannheim.
145. Interview # 5, Prosecutor, Bonn.
146. Compare BGH, StV 97, 572, Beschluss v. 20.06.1997; BGH, StV 2000, 237,
Beschluss v. 8.3.2000, with BGH, StV 2000, 4, Beschluss v. 19.10.1999; BGH,
5StR714/99, Urteil v. 21.04.1999.
147. BGH GSSt 1/04, NJW 1440/05, Beschluss v. 3.3.2005.
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also required judges to notify the defendant, on the record and after
the verdict has been rendered, that he has the right to appeal the
verdict and that any previous commitment to waive appellate reme-
dies is not binding.148 If after receiving this notice, the defendant
still declares a waiver, and the prosecution follows suit, the judgment
becomes final.
The Federal Supreme Court's decision struck a reasonable bal-
ance between the values of predictability and fairness. It left the par-
ties free to discuss an appeals waiver, so as to ensure finality in the
plea bargaining process. But it also established procedural safe-
guards-prohibiting judges from demanding a waiver and requiring
them to notify defendants of the right to appeal-to ensure that de-
fendants would not waive their right to appeal unwittingly or under
pressure by the court.
Another potential conflict between predictability and fairness
may arise when a judge provides an assessment of the expected post-
trial sentence. On the one hand, such information is very helpful to
the defendant in making a knowing choice about the acceptability of
a plea bargain. On the other hand, it may be perceived as a threat to
impose a harsher sentence unless the defendant takes the offer on
the table. Various procedural safeguards can be adopted to minimize
the risk of judicial coercion in such situations, but they decrease the
amount of information flowing to the parties. Currently, German
plea bargaining practice weighs heavily in the direction of providing
maximum information to the parties, rather than of minimizing judi-
cial coercion.149
2. Accuracy and Fairness
Plea bargaining increases the efficiency and predictability of
criminal adjudication, and judicial involvement in plea negotiations
further enhances predictability in a particular case. At the same
time, plea bargaining may undermine the judge's duty to investigate
the "truth of the matter." 50 It shortens significantly the actual trial
and sentencing proceedings, so the judge has less opportunity to ver-
ify independently the factual basis for the defendant's admission of
guilt.15 1 For that reason, German judges who participate in plea ne-
gotiations are sometimes accused of flouting their responsibility to
148. Id.
149. See infra Section III.C.3.
150. BGH, Anfragebeschl. v. 24.7.2003, StV 10/2003, 545; ScHONMAn', supra
note 96, at B81-84; Langer, From Legal Transplants, supra note 10, at 44-45; Pfister,
supra note 112, at 179; Thomas Weigend, Abgesprochene Gerechtigkeit, JZ 1990, 774,
777; Interview # 24, Landgericht Judge, Berlin ("The downside of plea bargaining is
that it conflicts with a central principle of our criminal process, that the court must
clarify the facts .... ).
151. E.g., Interview # 9, Landgericht Judge, Cologne.
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ensure that the verdict and sentence are accurate and fair. They are
criticized for sacrificing thoroughness and fair treatment for the sake
of expediency.152 Yet the interviews gathered for this study suggest
that truth-seeking remains a central purpose of judges' participation
in plea negotiations.
German judges' role in plea bargaining is shaped by a long in-
quisitorial tradition expressly entrusting them with the duty to ex-
plore the truth. Under the German Criminal Procedure Code, judges
have the responsibility of gathering all the necessary evidence to in-
vestigate the substantive truth of the case.153 Judges often do so on
their own initiative, or, where a party files a motion for evidence-
taking, they are generally required to conduct further investigations
in line with the party's motion.154
The rise of plea bargaining has undoubtedly shifted some empha-
sis from truth-seeking to efficiency in German criminal practice. The
concessions of truth-seeking to efficiency are much discussed in Ger-
man legal scholarship 55 and were raised by some of the interview-
ees. For example, some defense attorneys intentionally file multiple
evidence-gathering motions, or threaten to summon witnesses living
abroad, which might prolong the proceedings substantially.15 6 Some
judges would grant the defendant sentencing concessions in exchange
for the defense ceasing the evidence-gathering motions.15 7 These
judges are offering a discount that has nothing to do with the blame-
worthiness of the defendant. The sentence is lower not because the
defendant is less culpable, but because the court is too busy to ad-
dress all the motions filed by an aggressive defense attorney.
Another concession to efficiency is the shortening of the process
by which the facts of the case are established. Although judges are
supposed to verify themselves the factual basis of the case, when a
case is plea bargained, they are more likely to accept "quick confes-
sions" in which the defendant admits simply that the charges as laid
out by the prosecution are correct.15 8 Such a quick confession may
fail to illuminate the details of the case. A plea bargain based on a
"confession" of this kind may produce a worse outcome for the defen-
dant than a full trial, especially where the defense attorney and the
judge make an inaccurate assessment of the few facts uncovered
152. See supra note 150.
153. StPO § 244(2).
154. StPO § 244(2)-(3).
155. See supra note 150.
156. E.g., Herrmann, supra note 97, at 760. Because of changes in the Criminal
Procedure Code, the threat to summon witnesses from abroad is no longer effective.
Weigend E-mail # 2 (citing StPO § 244 V 2).
157. E.g., Interview # 17, Landgericht Judge, Hamburg; Interview # 31, Defense
Attorney, Mannheim; Interview # 9, Landgericht Judge, Cologne.
158. E.g., Interview # 16, Prosecutor, Hamburg; Interview # 12, Defense Attorney,
Cologne.
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early in the proceedings.1 59 Truth-seeking may also be jeopardized
where judges agree to dismiss a number of provable "collateral"
charges in exchange for a confession to the "main" charges and a
quicker resolution of the case.16 0 The majority of judges interviewed
admitted that they are most likely to plea bargain where the case is
more legally or factually complex and the evidentiary record more
unwieldy.161
These admissions reveal that plea bargaining has had a real ef-
fect on the balance between efficiency and truth-seeking in German
criminal procedure. Efficiency is more important today than it was
when judges saw themselves primarily as official investigators aim-
ing to discover the truth. Today's judges have to balance their func-
tions as managers of plea negotiations against their duties as
supervisors and official investigators.16 2 One German prosecutor
was very critical of this effect of plea bargaining: "From the perspec-
tive of the court, you give up on the responsibility of the court to clar-
ify the matter and to fashion a just resolution .... The Court becomes
like a notary, who certifies something without much verification."163
Still, judges have not abandoned their commitment to truth-
seeking. Both the German Constitutional Court and the German
Federal Supreme Court have repeatedly held that the duty to seek
the truth requires judges to probe into the veracity of defendant's
confessions resulting from a plea bargain.' 64 Trial judges them-
selves, as well as other lawyers, perceive of the judges' role in plea
bargaining at least in part as official investigators of the truth.165 As
one defense attorney-otherwise skeptical of the fairness of plea bar-
gaining-explained, judges play a central role in plea negotiations,
leading the discussions and focused on uncovering the truth.166
Judges themselves deny sacrificing accuracy for efficiency and em-
phasize their role in imposing a just sentence. When they speak
about "quick confessions," it is often regarding cases they have heard
or read about in appellate case law, but rarely regarding their own
159. Interview # 9, Landgericht Judge, Cologne; Interview # 12, Defense Attorney,
Cologne.
160. E.g., Interview # 15, Landgericht Judge, Leipzig.
161. E.g., Interview # 16, Prosecutor, Hamburg (citing as an incentive to plea bar-
gain long records of intercepted phone conversations, especially conversations that
had to be translated from a foreign language); Interview # 32, Amtsgericht Judge,
Cologne; Interview # 15, Landgericht Judge, Leipzig.
162. Langer, From Legal Transplants, supra note 10, at 44-45.
163. Interview # 7, Prosecutor, Mannheim.
164. BVerfG, 1987 NStZ 419; BGHSt 43, 195, 204, 4 StR 240/97 (1997); BGH GSSt
1/04, NJW 1440/05, Beschluss v. 3.3.2005.
165. E.g., Interview # 9, Landgericht Judge, Cologne; Interview # 10, Landgericht
Judge, Berlin; Interview # 24, Landgericht Judge, Berlin; Interview # 12, Defense
Attorney, Cologne.
166. Interview # 12, Defense Attorney, Cologne.
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cases. 167 Those who acknowledge ending evidence-gathering early
note that they do so only when the written record before them clearly
establishes the defendant's guilt.s6 8 They insist that they carefully
review the file compiled by the police and even after a confession, ask
clarifying questions to confirm the facts in the record.169 Where the
file reveals ambiguities in the evidence, judges affirm that they
would follow up with additional questions or where that is not
enough, with further evidence-gathering. 170 Some would conduct
several days of proceedings before they conclude what an appropriate
disposition might be.171
When it comes to negotiations of charge dismissals, judges assert
that such dismissals do not impair the accuracy of sentencing. In
some cases, the court dismisses charges because the defense has
shown that they are based on weak evidence.172 Even where that is
not the case, the judge has vast sentencing discretion where numer-
ous offenses have been charged, so the dismissal of "collateral"
charges does not have a significant influence on the ultimate sen-
tence.173 One judge gave the example of charge dismissals in a mass
fraud case, where it would be impractical to call witnesses to confirm
each instance of fraud. The dismissal of charges for 30 or even 60
instances of fraud out of 200 would not, on its own, have an influence
167. Interview # 9, Landgericht Judge, Cologne (hearing from a colleague the the-
ory that cases are plea bargained where there is a risk of acquittal, but disagreeing
with that proposition); id. (explaining that he would not accept quick confessions un-
less they are supported by other evidence); see also Interview # 5, Prosecutor, Bonn
(although it is theoretically possible that a judge may not read the file carefully and
may allow a plea bargain that does not correspond to the facts, in his experience,
judges carefully review the file).
168. Interview # 9, Landgericht Judge, Cologne (noting that plea bargains are en-
tered to avoid further evidence-gathering only where the evidence already clearly es-
tablishes the defendant's guilt and the evidence-taking measures are perceived as
unnecessary and too time consuming).
169. Interview # 24, Landgericht Judge, Berlin (noting that he does so by asking
questions that only the defendant could answer); Interview # 17, Landgericht Judge,
Hamburg; Interview # 9, Landgericht Judge, Cologne (noting that additional inquiry
is necessary to corroborate a confession and that he would have grave misgivings
about accepting a confession that is difficult to verify).
170. E.g., Interview # 21, Landgericht Judge, Munich; see also Hassemer & Hip-
pler, supra note 88, at 362 (finding that proceedings after plea are similar to regular
trial proceedings and include a review of the evidence, albeit to a very limited extent).
171. Interview # 5, Prosecutor, Bonn (pointing out that the court would rarely
come to judgment, even when a plea bargain is anticipated, before the judges hear
evidence for several days of trial).
172. See Interview # 15, Landgericht Judge, Leipzig.
173. E.g., Interview # 21, Landgericht Judge, Munich; Interview # 15, Landgericht
Judge, Leipzig ("[It is relatively easy to drop some of the instances because there are
still many [sentencing] possibilities [for the court]"). It is not clear to what extent
these "collateral" charges reflect overcharging by the prosecution. The interviewees
did not identify overcharging as a problem, but some German commentators have
suggested that prosecutors file collateral charges to gain leverage in plea bargaining.
Weider, supra note 114, at 408.
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on the sentence.174 Even if some of the facts were not entirely clari-
fied during the trial, the sentence may still reflect the defendant's
blameworthiness. In some sense, this practice is similar to "relevant
conduct" enhancements under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, where
judges would take into account uncharged conduct proven by mere
preponderance of the evidence at sentencing.175
Other features of the German plea bargaining process also sug-
gest that judges remain oriented toward truth-seeking. Unlike their
American counterparts, German judges cannot accept a "plea of
guilty" where a defendant protests his innocence.176 A sentence dis-
count can be offered only where the defendant confesses guilt and
thus at least minimally assists in the search for truth. German de-
fendants cannot "plead" to hypothetical crimes,' 77 or to real crimes
they could not have committed.' 78 And the practice of "fact bargain-
ing"-whereby the parties misrepresent facts in order to ensure a
particular sentence negotiated between them-seems to occur rarely,
if at all, in Germany.179 As a Hamburg prosecutor explained, "It is
wrong to bargain about the evidence . . . . It is one thing for a plea
bargain to leave a question open, for example, whether a crime was
committed by a gang, but it is another to make it part of the bargain
that the conclusion would be that it was not committed by a gang."' 80
The rarity of fact bargaining in Germany is probably due to the ab-
sence of sentencing guidelines and the greater limits on charge bar-
gaining.' 8 ' Because the court and the parties in Germany are not
constrained by narrow sentencing ranges, they need not alter the
facts to achieve a particular sentence.
In comparison to their American counterparts, German judges
are also provided with better tools to fulfill their duty of investigating
the evidence. To begin, the evidence on file at the time of charging is
often more complete than the evidence that American prosecutors
have in their possession when they plea bargain. German prosecu-
tors begin plea bargaining only after the police have completed their
174. E.g., Interview # 5, Prosecutor, Bonn (pointing out that in a case of multiple
burglaries, the sentence would not depend on whether 35 or 40 cases of burglaries are
proven, so charge bargaining is common).
175. While these practices aim at aligning the sentence with the "real offense" com-
mitted by the defendant and are therefore truth-seeking, they also carry the risk of
enhancing the defendant's sentence without sufficient procedural safeguards.
176. Contrast with the American approach in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970).
177. Frase & Weigend, supra note 72, at 344.
178. Id.
179. Interview # 16, Prosecutor, Hamburg. But see Weigend E-mail # 2 (suggesting
that "partial" confessions are common and are a form of fact bargaining). For a review
of fact bargaining in U.S. federal courts, see Symposium, supra note 67.
180. Interview # 16, Prosecutor, Hamburg.
181. See supra notes 79-86, 91-105 and accompanying text.
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investigation. 1 8 2 Moreover, German police and prosecutors have a
duty to investigate and gather exculpatory, as well as inculpatory evi-
dence.' 83 Other factors being equal, the earlier, fuller investigation
of the facts in Germany means not only that the prosecution will be
less likely to bring innocent defendants to the negotiating table, but
also that it will be less likely to give unwarranted sentence reduc-
tions to defendants who have committed serious crimes. By contrast,
in the United States, "[ulnder the pressure of a heavy, time-consum-
ing caseload, the prosecutor may easily be seduced at an early stage
of the proceedings, before such facts are more fully developed, by the
offer of a quick guilty plea in exchange for a light sentence, only to
discover too late that the offense, or the offender, was far more seri-
ous than originally thought."184
The scope of discovery afforded to the defense is also greater in
Germany. The German system requires the prosecutor to disclose
fully its evidence, and the requirement applies at all stages of the
investigation.18 5 This is in stark contrast to U.S. practice at the fed-
eral level, where pre-plea discovery is much more limited. 86 Broader
and earlier disclosure by the prosecution, as practiced in Germany,
ensures that the court hears more informed arguments by the de-
fense during plea discussions and can better evaluate the accuracy
and fairness of a proposed plea bargain.
The judge herself has access to the entire file before she meets
with the parties for plea discussions.'8 7 This access to the record al-
lows judges to step in where lawyers may be failing in their represen-
tation. Some judges see this supervisory role as flowing naturally
from the duty to ensure that the plea reflects the true facts. As a
Berlin judge observed: .
The court does have a supervisory function, to verify the evi-
dence. The tendency with prosecutors is that they have in-
vestigated the case, they have delivered the charges .. . and
have done everything they had to do so that they think: "I
182. E.g., Interview # 5, Prosecutor, Bonn.
183. StPO § 160 II.
184. YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1282 (2002).
185. StPO § 147 ("Defense counsel shall be entitled to inspect those files which are
available to the court, those which would have been submitted to the court if charges
had been preferred, and to inspect officially impounded pieces of evidence."). In prac-
tice, discovery in many cases begins only when the investigation has been concluded.
Inspection of the file can be denied to the extent that it would endanger the success of
the investigation. StPO § 147 (2). Unlike in the United States, there is no obligation
for the defense to reciprocate in disclosing information about its case. See Frase &
Weigend, supra note 72, at 341.
186. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
187. The availability of the complete investigative file before negotiations explains
in large part German judges' willingness to accept "quick confessions." When a judge
has reviewed the facts laid out in the file, it is not surprising that in clear-cut cases,
she would be satisfied with the defendant's simple admission of guilt.
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would not have brought charges if I were not convinced that
the accused was the perpetrator." But this is not necessarily
true; there are also cases where the evidence presents itself
quite differently. And that is the task of the court, of course
also of the defense attorney, but in the first place of the
court, to find out, what the evidence really is.188
The same judge also opined that it is "important for the court to
support a little bit the defense attorney or the prosecutor who is una-
ble to represent her position adequately."189 Other judges explained
that they are most likely to take a lead in the negotiations where they
see an inexperienced or incompetent defense attorney.190 They see
their role as looking out for the interests of the defendant, but also as
ensuring that the sentence reflects the gravity of the crime. In pur-
suing these goals, the judge may intervene by advising a defendant
directly (though not too emphatically) about the benefits of a confes-
sion where the lawyer fails to do so,191 or may suggest a sentence
higher or lower than the one offered by the prosecution. 192
In short, in their attitude and by design, German judges remain
active supervisors of the accuracy of the confession and the fairness
of the sentence. While the introduction of plea bargaining may have
reduced the emphasis on truth-seeking in German criminal proce-
dure, the continued involvement by judges ensures that truth-seek-
ing plays a more central role in the German process than it does in
U.S. federal courts, where judges do not participate in plea negotia-
tions. Moreover, the willingness of German judges to step in where
the prosecutor or defense attorney fails in her duties renders the plea
negotiations fairer to both the defendant and the public at large.
The German practice of actively involving judges in plea bargain-
ing to ensure truthfulness in the process reflects a broader difference
between the adversarial and inquisitorial systems. In contrast to
188. Interview # 10, Landgericht Judge, Berlin. Some judges elaborated on the
cases in which they would reject a plea: "It would happen where the result seemed
unreasonable to me. Or where I thought a rich defendant was buying his freedom. Or
where I thought the sentence was too low. It's practically never about the dismissal of
charges, but about the sentence length." Interview # 24, Landgericht Judge, Berlin.
"For example, if in sexual abuse or rape cases, the bargain and the confession do not
match with the content of the files and the testimony of the victim, then I would not
accept a bargain. And I would want to examine the victim. Also where the confession
is only partial, when it leaves out much that is in the files, then I would not accept
bargains. And in the end, I am generally negatively predisposed toward bargains in
violent crimes." Interview # 10, supra.
189. Interview # 10, Landgericht Judge, Berlin.
190. Interview # 32, Amtsgericht Judge, Cologne; Interview # 9, Landgericht
Judge, Cologne.
191. Interview # 9, Landgericht Judge, Cologne.
192. See Interview # 24, Landgericht Judge, Berlin. But see Interview # 12, De-
fense Attorney, Cologne (explaining that if, on a rare occasion, the defense and prose-
cution agreed on a disposition without the judge's participation, it would be unlikely
that a judge would disturb it).
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continental Europe's criminal procedure, our system has tradition-
ally been more concerned with "procedural" rather than with "sub-
stantive" truth.193 We are likely to accept the outcome of a criminal
case as legitimate as long as it is reached in conformity with procedu-
ral rules.194 For that reason, we rely on the parties to investigate the
truth and on the judge to ensure that the rules are obeyed. The Ger-
man criminal justice system, by contrast, aims to uncover the sub-
stantive truth of the case, and it does not trust the adversarial
process to fulfill that role.
Our adversarial model works well in the context of a public trial,
but it is not as well-suited to plea negotiations, which occur out of
public sight and, in many U.S. jurisdictions, out of the judge's sight
too. The German practice of involving judges in the negotiations may
be a better way to ensure fair plea'bargaining, as long as it does not
lead to judicial coercion of defendants to plead guilty.
3. Judicial Supervision and Coercion
If some commentators are concerned that judges in Germany do
not supervise the plea carefully enough,s95 others worry that a domi-
nant judge might prejudge the case and coerce a defendant into en-
tering a plea. Concerned about the coercive potential of active
judicial participation in plea bargaining, the Federal Supreme Court
has held that the defendant cannot be pressured to enter a plea bar-
gain through threats of a higher sentence or through unlawful
promises. 196 There are both substantive and procedural aspects of
the case law against judicial coercion.
On the procedural side, the Federal Supreme Court has held that
the substance of the plea bargain must be announced in open court,
on the record, and with all parties present.197 This rule minimizes
the possibility of judicial coercion, but it is not followed scrupulously
in practice. As mentioned earlier, the common practice is for the par-
ties, together with the judge, to meet in private and engage in prelim-
inary plea negotiations. These negotiations rarely include the lay
judges. The defendant is also usually absent, although his counsel is
there to represent his interests. Although the defense attorney can
insist that the substance of the plea negotiations be entered on the
record, attorneys rarely do so, lest they upset the plea bargain or
193. Thomas Weigend, Is the Criminal Process About Truth?: A German Perspec-
tive, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 157, 168 (2003).
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Weigend, supra note 150, at 777 (arguing that courts do not examine
the factual basis of the plea with sufficient care).
196. BGH St 43, 195, 202 ff., 4 StR 240/97 (1997).
197. Id.; BGH, Anfragebeschl. v. 24.7.2003, StV 10/2003, 545.
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strain relations with the court.198 The record commonly includes
only the result of the negotiations-typically, the sentence that the
defendant may expect in return for a confession. The open-court an-
nouncement of the result would not mention potentially unlawful
promises or threats that might have influenced the defense to accept
the bargain. It offers neither a meaningful guarantee of trans-
parency nor an effective safeguard against judicial coercion.
A substantive safeguard against judicial coercion is the rule that
a judge may be disqualified from a case for bias. Removal for bias can
occur if the judge fails to include a relevant party in the negotia-
tions,' 99 or if she makes remarks that might coerce the defendant
into confessing. 200 It may sometimes be hard to distinguish whether
the judge is simply informing the defendant of the likely outcome of
trial in the absence of a confession or pressuring the defendant to
make a confession. 201 The standard is whether a reasonable defen-
dant would conclude that the judge has predetermined the outcome of
the case. 202 Under that standard, remarks by the judge suggesting
that the evidence is stacked against the defendant and that a confes-
sion would mean a lighter sentence, especially when couched in re-
proachful language, may be grounds for removal. 203 A judge may
also be disqualified if he expresses a clear opinion on how the case
should be resolved before reviewing all of the evidence. 204 The case
law on judicial bias deters at least some judges from being too asser-
tive in plea negotiations 205 or committing to a particular sentence. 206
Even where a defendant fails to file a motion to disqualify an
overbearing judge for bias, he may raise the question of judicial coer-
cion on appeal. If he shows that the judge used threats of a higher
sentence or unlawful promises to procure a plea bargain, the judg-
198. See Weider, supra note 114, at 412 (urging defense attorneys to demand a
fuller record).
199. BGH 4 StR 240/97, Urteil v. 28.8.1997.
200. BGH 1 StR 574103, Urteil v. 2.3.2004; BGH 3 StR 452/04, Beschluss v.
8.2.2005 (noting that a judge may be disqualified where he suggests to defense coun-
sel that if the defendant does not accept plea offer that day, expert testimony the
following day may lead to imposition of heavier sentence).
201. E.g., Karsten Altenhain & Michael Haimerl, Modelle konsensualer Erledigung
des Hauptverfahrens, 152 GOLTDAMMER's ARCHrv 281, 289-92 (2005).
202. BGH 1 StR 574103, Urteil v. 2.3.2004.
203. Id.; cf. Herrmann, supra note 97, at 74 (noting that a judge who is overzealous
in trying to steer the plea negotiations may be disqualified on grounds of bias).
204. LuTz MEYER-GOSSNER, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG § 24, 101-02 (2005). Compare
Interview # 5, Prosecutor, Bonn, and Interview # 18, Landgericht Judge, Hamburg
(suggesting that bias would be found where the judge states a specific sentence, in-
stead of a sentencing cap, that the defendant could expect to receive as part of a plea
bargain), with MEYER-GOSSNER, supra, at 102 (suggesting that commitment to a spe-
cific sentence would not be enough to warrant removal for bias).
205. See Interview # 15, Landgericht Judge, Leipzig; Interview # 5, Prosecutor,
Bonn; Interview # 18, Landgericht Judge, Hamburg.
206. Interview # 31, Defense Attorney, Mannheim.
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ment would be reversed. 207 The availability of appellate remedies is
therefore a critical procedural safeguard against judicial coercion.
But as mentioned earlier, recent case law has sanctioned appeals
waivers, as long as the court has not been complicit in obtaining
them. In any event, formal limits on appellate waivers have not been
observed closely in practice. The repeat interaction between judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys in a particular district means that
judges could refuse to bargain in the future with those attorneys who
regularly seek appellate review of plea bargains with the court.208
While these protections against judicial overreaching are often
circumvented in practice, several structural safeguards help mini-
mize the overall coerciveness of German plea bargaining. First, plea
negotiations still occur in fewer cases in Germany than in the United
States. While the percentage of cases plea bargained varies greatly
by locality and by type of case,209 the average national figure is esti-
mated to fall somewhere between 30 and 50 percent.210 The rate is
significantly lower than in the United States, where over 90 percent
of convictions are by guilty plea. 211 The common presumption in Ger-
many, at least at present, is that the case will go to trial and not that
it will be plea-bargained. This presumption may reduce the likeli-
hood that judges will press for a plea bargain, or that defendants will
quickly accept one.
Another reason for the lower level of coerciveness of German plea
bargaining is the relative mildness of the expected post-trial sentence
and the smaller discounts given to defendants who confess guilt.
German sentences expected after trial are significantly lower than
American post-trial sentences. 212 The highest statutory sentence is
207. BGH 4 StR 84/04, Urteil v. 16.9.2004 (reversing judgment and ordering new
trial of defendant who was threatened with pretrial detention if he refused to confess
and persisted in filing motions to subpoena witnesses located abroad).
208. Weider, supra note 114, at 409. The phenomenon of judges punishing recalci-
trant attorneys by denying them benefits in future cases has been observed in Ameri-
can courts as well. MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF
PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 63-68 (1977).
209. Larger cities, particularly Munich and Berlin, seem to have a higher rate of
plea bargaining than smaller cities, and plea bargaining occurs more frequently in
white-collar crime and drug cases than in other cases.
210. Pfister, supra note 112, at 178 (citing an estimate that plea bargaining occurs
in 50 percent of criminal cases); SCHONEmANN, supra note 96, at B18 (estimating that
in 1990 plea bargaining occurred in 20-30 percent of cases).
211. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING (2002),
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/fccp02.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2005) (show-
ing that federal prosecutors declined to prosecute 27 percent of all matters investi-
gated in 2002, that 89 percent of those whose criminal cases were concluded in federal
district court were convicted, and that 96 percent of those convicted pleaded guilty or
no contest); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
URBAN COUNTIES 24 tbl. 23 (2002) (showing that 61 percent of arrest charges in large-
county state courts were resolved through a guilty plea).
212. Frase and Weigend estimate that sentences are on average three times more
severe in the United States than in Germany. Frase & Weigend, supra note 72, at
234 [Vol. 54
PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
15 years, except in cases of murder, where life imprisonment is
mandatory. The vast majority of criminal cases are resolved through
fines.213 Moreover, plea bargaining is rarely used to dispose of vio-
lent crime cases. For that reason, in many of the cases that are re-
solved through bargaining, the expected sentence is likely to be fairly
low.
The reward that German defendants are likely to receive for con-
fessing and cooperating is also likely to be somewhat lower than that
given to American defendants. While in U.S. federal court, the aver-
age discount for pleading guilty could be as high as two-thirds off the
sentence expected after trial,214 in Germany, an admission of guilt is
commonly rewarded with a one-fourth to one-third reduction in the
expected sentence. 215 Accordingly, the difference between the bar-
gained-for and post-trial sentences is at most five years; more often,
it is mere months. Where trial courts go beyond this accepted sen-
tencing discount, appellate courts may step in. Although German ap-
pellate courts rarely intervene in sentencing matters, they are more
likely to do so in cases where the differential between a bargained-for
sentence and the sentence considered proportional to the offense is
deemed too great.216 At the same time, appeals of an excessive plea
discount are rare because defendants have no interest in contesting a
lenient sentence, and prosecutors avoid challenging bargains to
which they have already agreed.
There is an important exception to the generally low sentencing
discounts offered in Germany. Defendants receive a substantial plea
discount when the execution of their sentence is suspended, which
can occur when the imprisonment imposed does not exceed two
347-48; see also JAMES WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 71 (2005) (noting that prison
sentences are on average "far shorter" in Germany than in the United States).
213. StGB § 47 (providing that imprisonment of less than six months should be
imposed only in exceptional cases and that fines should be imposed instead).
214. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
215. Interview # 5, Prosecutor, Bonn; Interview # 24, Landgericht Judge, Berlin;
Interview # 26, Defense Attorney, Cologne; Interview # 11, Amtsgericht Judge, Mu-
nich (one-fourth); Interview # 18, Landgericht Judge, Hamburg (between 10 percent
and 30 percent, depending on the strength of the evidence); Interview # 10, Lan-
dgericht Judge, Berlin ("Between half a year and three years, but it depends a lot on
the case . .. [T]he discount is smaller than in the United States because German
sentences are shorter, with the maximum at 15 years." ); Interview # 27, Prosecutor,
Cologne ("At least a third. In very complicated cases even more."); Interview # 32,
Amtsgericht Judge, Cologne (citing as typical a reduction of a four-year sentence to
three and one-half years).
216. BGH StR 411/04, Beschluss v. 12.1.2005 (holding that a proposed plea dis-
count of about 50 percent, from a sentence of six-seven years to a sentence of three
years and six months, was unlawful, because it was an unwarranted reward for a
confession and might unduly coerce a defendant into confessing); BGH StV 2004, 470
(5 StR 579/03) (holding that a two-thirds discount, from six years to two years, is
unlawful because it may coerce a defendant to plead guilty); BGH, NStZ 2004, 164 (1
ARs 27/03), cited in Pfister, supra note 112, at 179; see also BGH, StV 2000, 556 (2StR
388/99); StV 2002, 637 (1StR 171/02).
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years.217 As part of a plea bargain in less serious cases, the court
often reduces the time to which the defendant is sentenced to two
years or less, suspends execution of the sentence, and grants proba-
tion. Here, the discount is worth a lot more than the reduction in the
sentence itself-it spares the defendant from spending any time be-
hind bars. Still, when it comes to sentences served, low plea dis-
counts combine with mild sentences to reduce somewhat the
coerciveness of plea bargaining.
Other features of the German process, however, leave room for
judicial coercion and raise more serious concerns. As noted earlier,
appellate waivers are a common feature of plea agreements-
whether as a formal or informal matter. Even where the parties ex-
ercise their right to appeal, the lack of a record of the substance of
plea discussions also means that appellate courts cannot adequately
police judicial behavior. As one practitioner has suggested, German
defense attorneys have not made good use of all the procedural pro-
tections against coercion available under the Federal Supreme
Court's case law. 2 18
The case law itself is not always sensitive to dangers of coercion.
For example, it provides that statements by the defendant offered to
support the plea bargain may be considered by the court at a subse-
quent trial if the bargain falls through. 219 Once the defendant has
made some incriminating statements pursuant to a plea bargain, he
or she has no good exit strategy if the bargain falls through.
There are two structural features of German procedure which
further increase the risk of coercion. The first is the common practice
of German judges to initiate plea discussions, and the second is the
participation of the judge involved in the negotiations in the trial of
the defendant where the negotiations fail. Where the judge initiates
the plea discussions, a defendant may feel additional pressure to con-
fess-both because of the inherent authority of the court and because
the same judge or judges who are involved in the plea negotiations
would decide the defendant's guilt or innocence and sentence if a bar-
gain falls through. Although lay judges will also have a say, their
influence is marginal. By contrast, in the United States, a defendant
who rejects a pretrial offer by a judge to plead guilty may request a
jury trial. And in some U.S. jurisdictions that allow judges to take
part in plea negotiations, the judge involved in plea negotiations
must recuse himself from the trial and sentencing of a defendant who
has rejected the judge's pretrial plea offer.
The interviews do not suggest that undue judicial pressure in
plea negotiations is a systemic problem in Germany. Few practition-
217. StGB § 56.
218. Weider, supra note 114, at 409.
219. Pfister, supra note 112.
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ers pointed to examples from their own experience in which a judge
directly pressured a defendant to plead guilty.22 0 Some expressly re-
jected the possibility that a defendant might confess to a crime he has
not committed as a result of judicial involvement in plea bargain-
ing.2 2 1 Still, a number of practitioners clearly worry about the volun-
tariness of plea bargaining. 222 Even if coercion is relatively rare, it
results in serious injustice and ought to be minimized. The German
system can do more to ensure that active judicial involvement does
not have a coercive effect on defendants and prosecutors. As we shall
see in the next Part, American jurisdictions such as Florida and Con-
necticut fare better in reducing the coerciveness of judge-mediated
plea negotiations.
IV. Two AMERICAN MODELS OF JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT: THE JUDGE
AS INFORMATION SOURCE AND AS MODERATOR
The German model of involving judges in the negotiations dis-
plays several features that can be a guide to reform of American plea
bargaining practices. German judges help produce a more informed
plea bargain by advising the parties of the applicable sentencing
ranges. By carefully studying the evidence and providing a neutral
perspective on the case early in the negotiations, the judges also pro-
mote fairness and accuracy in plea bargaining. But the German
model may appear too foreign to be a useful guide for reform in the
United States. The active supervisory role played by the judge may
seem more consistent with inquisitorial methods of investigating and
adjudicating a case.
This Part reviews two American systems, Florida and Connecti-
cut, which have also allowed judicial involvement in plea negotia-
220. Interview # 21, Landgericht Judge, Munich (reporting a case of alleged coer-
cion in the regional court and saying that it is possible that some judges exercise
pressure on defendants to plead guilty); Interview # 32, Amtsgericht Judge, Cologne
(stating that judges probably induce defendants to confess by threatening them with a
longer post-trial sentence); Interview # 10, Landgericht Judge, Berlin ("I have also
heard that in some cases, courts accept a plea bargain in cases with uncertain evi-
dence. And the defense attorneys say that sometimes they strike bargains because
they cannot predict what the court would do and are afraid that the sentence would be
much higher. I would not say that the accused are innocent, but that is what they
claim. I find that very problematic, even irresponsible, that an accused is pressed into
a corner, because he is being threatened with a long sentence."); Interview # 31, De-
fense Attorney, Mannheim (observing that some of his clients felt they were pressed
to agree to a particular version of the facts of the case because of the plea discount);
Interview # 14, Prosecutor, Munich (in isolated cases, judges "work on" defendants for
too long). Judges may also prod prosecutors to accept a deal. Interview # 7, Prosecu-
tor, Mannheim ("[01ften . . . the court pushes for a quick resolution under 153a, before
I have had a chance to investigate the case properly, and that is when I have my
doubts .... ).
221. Interview # 13, Prosecutor, Munich (judges do not pressure defendants into
accepting plea); Interview # 15, Landgericht Judge, Leipzig (expressing the belief that
an innocent defendant would not confess to a crime he has not committed).
222. See supra note 220.
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tions, albeit to a different degree. The review suggests that greater
participation of judges is not inimical to our adversarial system.
Quite to the contrary, the experiences of Florida and Connecticut
point to different ways in which judges can play a role in negotiations
and thus enhance the fairness and accuracy of the plea bargaining
process.
A. Florida: The Judge as Information Source
The current ABA Standards on Criminal Justice and more than
a dozen states provide for a limited role for judges during the plea
negotiations. 223 Under the Standards, which have been followed in a
number of states' rules, judges are not to participate actively in plea
negotiations. Upon request of the parties, however, a judge may ex-
plain under what conditions the plea bargain would be acceptable to
her. The main impetus behind this rule is to provide certainty to the
parties when sentence reductions or charge dismissals are at stake.
Florida is a jurisdiction that has adopted the ABA-recommended
model of the judge as an information source. It stands out among
other jurisdictions because it has developed case law delineating
fairly clear limits on judicial participation. This Section reviews the
case law and practice of plea bargaining in Florida and assesses the
value of involving the judge as an information source for the parties.
1. Warner and the Florida Rules on Judicial Participation
The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provide the baseline forjudicial involvement in plea bargaining. Rule 3.171(d) allows judges
to advise the parties, prior to the acceptance of a plea, whether fac-
tors unknown to the parties at the time may make the judge's concur-
rence to the plea impossible. 224 In 1975, the Florida Supreme Court
held that the Rule should be read literally and that it allows judicial
participation in plea discussions. 225 The boundaries of this participa-
tion were left unsettled until 2000, when, in State v. Warner, the
court faced the question whether a sentence is "per se invalid where
223. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-3.3(d) (3rd ed.
1999). The states include Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New York, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. ARiz.
R. CRIM. P. 17.4; State v. Warner, 762 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2000); People v. Dunn, 342 Ill.
App. 3d 872 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003); Lineberry v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1151 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001); Barnes v. State, 523 A.2d 635, 639 (Md. 1987); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 543
N.E.2d 22, 24 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989); People v. Cobbs, 505 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1993);
Brown v. State, 821 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Milinovich, 887
P.2d 214, 216 (Mont. 1994); McMahon v. Hodges, 382 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2004) (discuss-
ing New York state law); Ryder v. State, 83 P.3d 856, 863 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004);
Medlin v. State, 280 S.E.2d 648 (S.C. 1981); see also supra note 6, listing California,Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, and Ohio as states that allow, but discourage
participation.
224. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.171(d).
225. Davis v. State, 308 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1975).
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the trial court, over the state's objection, advises a defendant regard-
ing what sentence would be imposed pursuant to a plea of guilty, and
accepts the defendant's subsequent guilty plea."2 2 6 In a thorough,
well-reasoned opinion about the costs and benefits of judicial partici-
pation in plea bargaining, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the
acceptability of such participation. At the same time, the court estab-
lished certain limits within which such participation must occur.
First, the court emphasized that the judge should serve as a pro-
vider of information about the ultimate sentence, not as a mediator
between the parties. 227 The judge's discretion in plea negotiations
would thus extend to "stat[ing] on the record the length of sentence
which, on the basis of information then available to the judge, ap-
pears to be appropriate for the charged offense."228 Moreover, be-
cause the judge is a mere information provider and not an active
participant, she should not initiate the plea dialogue. She may par-
ticipate only in response to a party's request. 2 2 9
To minimize the possibility that the court may prejudge the out-
come of the case, Warner held that a judge's preliminary evaluation
of the case is not binding where material new facts emerge before the
sentencing hearing.230 Although the court acknowledged the risk of
prejudice arising from the judge's involvement in plea negotiations, it
did not require judges who had been involved in plea discussions to
recuse themselves in the case of a plea withdrawal. The court con-
cluded that "[a] judge's candid statement of how a case appears at an
early stage of the proceedings does not prevent the judge from decid-
ing the case in a fair and evenhanded manner later, when additional
facts become known."231
226. State v. Warner, 762 So. 2d 507, 507 (Fla. 2000).
227. Although Florida courts have consistently emphasized the limited role of
judges as information providers, a more recent Florida Supreme Court case suggests
that the Court may tolerate greater involvement by judges, as long as it is not coer-
cive. Wilson v. State, 845 So. 2d 142, 156 (Fla. 2003). As a dissenting member of the
Court observed, the totality of circumstances test adopted by the court allows judges
to act as more than "information centers" in plea negotiations. Id. at 161.
228. Warner, 762 So. 2d at 514; see also Wilson, 845 So. 2d at 160-61 (Lewis, J.,
concurring in result in part and dissenting in part) ("Under Warner, while judges may
have limited participation in the plea bargaining process, they may not be a party to
the actual plea the defendant must weigh. Judges are to act as information centers
only. The limited Warner holding was intended to allow a judicial officer to provide
information to a defendant and answers to his or her questions. Clearly, the judge
may not initiate the bargaining process or make statements that could in any way be
construed as actual negotiation.").
229. State v. Faulk, 840 So. 2d 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that court's
initiation of plea negotiations is per se reversible error); Davis v. State, 860 So. 2d
1058 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
230. Warner, 762 So. 2d at 514.
231. Id. (noting that concerns "that the trial court will be unable to rule fairly on
the voluntariness of a bargain it has helped to induce, or a perception of unseemliness
potentially evoked by judicial plea bargaining[,] appear to be unique to judicial in-
volvement beyond that contemplated by rule 3.171").
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Recognizing the risk of coercion by judges who engage in plea
bargaining and sentencing in the same case, the court established
special procedures to minimize that risk. First, it prohibited judges
from initiating plea negotiations. Second, it required that all plea-
related communications between the judge and the parties be entered
into the record.232 A judge must also refrain from stating or implying
"alternative sentencing possibilities which hinge upon future proce-
dural choices, such as the exercise of a defendant's right to trial."2 3 3
The last two requirements are complementary: A defendant can chal-
lenge a coercive judicial remark more effectively when that remark is
entered into the record. All of these factors may be considered in the
context of a motion to disqualify a judge, in which a defendant attests
to a fear that he would not receive a fair hearing from the trial
judge.234
Alternatively, where a defendant rejects the judge's pretrial of-
fer, proceeds to trial, and then receives a significantly higher sen-
tence than he had been offered pre-trial, he may challenge that
sentence on the grounds of judicial vindictiveness. The factors to be
reviewed at that stage are similar to those considered in a motion to
disqualify a judge: (1) whether the judge initiated the plea discus-
sions; (2) whether the judge urged the defendant to accept a plea or
implied that the sentence imposed would hinge on future procedural
choices, such as exercising the right to trial; (3) whether the disparity
between the plea offer and the ultimate sentence is significant; and
(4) whether the judge pointed to facts on the record to account for the
increased sentence. 235 Many cases turn on the last factor. If the
judge imposes a significantly higher sentence after trial, without giv-
ing reasons for the departure from the pre-trial offer, the appeals
court is likely to find judicial vindictiveness. 2 3 6
2. Judicial Involvement in Practice
The practice of plea bargaining in Florida diverges in various
ways from the parameters established by case law. Florida practi-
tioners report that judges sometimes overstep their role as "informa-
tion providers" in plea negotiations-a practice that seems to be
tolerated by the Florida Supreme Court as long as it is not coer-
cive. 2 3 7 The extent of involvement varies from judge to judge. While
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Pierce v. State, 873 So. 2d 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
235. Wilson v. State, 845 So. 2d 142, 156 (Fla. 2003).
236. E.g., Blanco v. State, 849 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Domin-
guez v. State, 863 So. 2d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
237. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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some judges never participate in plea negotiations, 238 others serve as
"sounding boards for the parties,"239 and yet others actively mediate
plea discussions between the parties. 240 Judges are especially likely
to become involved in plea negotiations in cases that are too politi-
cally sensitive for the prosecution to bargain on its own.2 4 1 It is not
unusual for the parties to come to the judge after they have tried and
failed to resolve their differences. As one defense attorney com-
mented, "It varies by prosecutor. The hard-liners who make tough
offers also have more plea conferences [with the judge] ."242
Judges may also be involved more actively in pretrial when they
are worried about the competence of the defense attorney or the pros-
ecutor or where a defendant is unrepresented. 243 Further, they are
more likely to participate actively in urban districts, where the
caseload is higher.244 As several practitioners commented, judges
use their involvement in plea negotiations as a means to speed cases
along.2 4 5 Finally, judges are more likely to step in where they have
more discretion in the ultimate disposition-for example, where jail
time is not mandatory, and the judge can choose among many alter-
native punishments.246 Conversely, some judges are reluctant to
participate in plea negotiations concerning violent crimes because of
their concern for the victim. 2 4 7
Negotiations involving the court usually occur during the pre-
trial conference. Because pre-trial conferences are routine, it is hard
to tell who "initiates" plea discussions with the court-such discus-
sions appear to be a matter of course. 248 The open-court pretrial con-
ference generally guarantees a public record of the discussions. But
238. Telephone Interview, Willie Meggs, State Attorney, 2nd Jud. Cir., Florida
(stating that judges in the Second Judicial Circuit are not involved in plea negotia-
tions); Telephone Interview, Wayne Durden, State Attorney's Office, 10th Jud. Cir.,
Florida, Nov. 2, 2005 [hereinafter FL Prosecutor Durden] (noting that judges are
rarely involved in the Tenth Judicial Circuit).
239. E.g., Telephone Interview with Circuit Court Judge, Florida, Oct. 28, 2005
[hereinafter FL Judge # 3].
240. E.g., Telephone Interview with Circuit Court Judge, Florida, June 9, 2005
[hereinafter FL Judge # 1]; Telephone Interview with Nancy Daniels, Public De-
fender, 2nd Jud. Cir., Florida, June 23, 2005 [hereinafter FL Public Defender
Daniels].
241. FL Judge # 1 (stating that judges are most likely to be involved "where the
state attorney would rather not take the political heat if a deal is to be made").
242. FL Public Defender Daniels.
243. E.g., FL Judge # 3; Interview with Attorneys # 1 and # 2, State Attorney's
Office, 17th Jud. Cir., Florida, Mar. 14, 2005 [hereinafter FL Prosecutors # 1 and # 2].
244. FL Judge # 1.
245. Id.; Questionnaire, Florida Public Defender # 1, June 22, 2005 [hereinafter FL
Public Defender # 1].
246. FL Judge # 1; Telephone Interview with Circuit Court Judge, Florida, Oct. 31,
2005 [hereinafter FL Judge #4].
247. Telephone Interview with Circuit Court Judge # 2, Florida, Aug. 29, 2005
[hereinafter FL Judge # 2].
248. FL Judge # 1. Plea discussions often begin when the judge asks about the
status of the case at a pretrial conference. FL Public Defender Daniels.
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some practitioners note that chamber discussions, off the record, also
occur from time to time. 2 4 9 Off-the-record discussions are seen as en-
couraging candor among the participants. 250
Whether in open court or in chamber discussions, the negotia-
tions proceed in a similar fashion. The prosecution typically lays out
its case first, reciting some of the material facts and asking for a par-
ticular disposition. 251 Usually, the prosecutor's case would include
the nature of the crime, the background of the defendant, and the
defendant's score under the Florida sentencing system-most impor-
tantly, whether the defendant is eligible for probation or jail is
mandatory.252 The defense attorney responds with his or her own
interpretation of the facts, with information on mitigating facts and
with a request for a more lenient disposition. The court's knowledge
of the evidence in the case is more limited than that of the parties.
The judge does not see all of the information that is available to the
defense under the liberal discovery rules in Florida. With respect to
written documents, the judge is likely to have seen only a probable
cause affidavit filed by the prosecution. 253 So at pretrial, she has to
make an evaluation of the case based on the affidavit and select facts
that the parties present orally at that time.
Typically, the court does not actively mediate between the two
sides, but simply offers a disposition of the case after hearing both
the prosecution and the defense.254 The judge communicates the ex-
pected post-plea sentence in the form of a sentence cap, a range, or a
fixed sentence. 255 In some cases, the court asks the defendant to
enter an open plea without an assurance as to the sentence. This is
something that defendants are reluctant to do256-after all, one of
the most important benefits of a plea bargain is the certainty about
the ultimate disposition. But even if a judge states that he would
impose a particular sentence after a plea, he is not bound by it. So it
is not entirely uncommon that new facts emerging at sentencing on
occasion may lead the judge to change his mind. He may reject the
plea altogether, or he may add new conditions and allow the defen-
dant to accept the conditions or back out of the deal.2 5 7
249. E.g., FL Public Defender # 1.
250. Questionnaire, Florida Public Defender # 2, June 22, 2005 [hereinafter FL
Public Defender # 21.
251. Id.
252. E.g., FL Judge # 1.
253. E.g., FL Judge # 2.
254. E.g., FL Public Defender # 2; FL Judge # 4. Though this seems to be the
exception, some judges also comment on the merits of each side's position. Telephone
Interview with Circuit Court Judge # 5, Florida, Oct. 21, 2005.
255. E.g., FL Judge # 1 (any of the three); FL Public Defender # 2 (fixed sentence).
256. FL Public Defender # 2.




Judges generally refrain from giving information about the possi-
ble post-trial sentence, because such statements may be perceived as
coercing the defendant into waiving his right to trial. 2 5 8 Instead, a
typical comment by the judge to the defense might take the following
form: "I have not seen the witnesses and the other information that
might come at trial, but just from the information I have here, I think
you would get X [years]. But if we go to trial, you might get a different
sentence if a lot of the evidence is new."2 5 9 Such reluctance to ex-
press an opinion about the post-trial sentence seems to be the norm
in Florida. Several practitioners reported that some judges still
threaten that the sentence would be much higher after trial.260 But
it does not seem to be a widespread problem, particularly since appel-
late courts have become more vigilant about such threats.261 If the
defendant indeed backs out of a deal, judges may still occasionally act
on their threat. Practitioners disagree on the extent to which such
vindictive sentencing occurs, but they concur that appellate case law
formally prohibits it.262
3. Evaluating the Florida Model
The Florida Supreme Court has opined that the main value of
judicial participation is to provide greater certainty for both parties
as to the sentencing outcome of the case. As the court has suggested,
a clear statement about the sentence to be imposed can enhance the
judge's role as a neutral arbiter of the case, instead of leaving matters
largely in the prosecutor's hands.263 The predictability provided by
the judge's involvement is especially valuable where, as in Florida,
the sentencing scheme itself provides little information about the
post-plea or post-trial disposition. In Florida, a sentencing "score
sheet" has replaced a system of sentencing guidelines, but it is less
helpful than the guidelines in assisting the parties in making an in-
258. E.g., FL Judge # 1; FL Judge # 2.
259. FL Judge # 1. The judge may also say: "My inclination would be X, without
commitment." FL Public Defender Daniels; FL Public Defender # 2 ("The judges are
very careful when it comes to telling you what your client will get if he loses at trial
.... He doesn't want there to be a perception of vindictive sentencing.").
260. E.g., FL Public Defender Daniels ("We have a couple ofjudges who threaten to
give a tough sentence.").
261. FL Judge # 1 ("Judges who try to coerce defendants are likely to have a lot
more trials. I would say it does not happen very often. More generally, appeals courts
and the culture has changed, so coercion is less likely to happen."); FL Judge # 2
(observing that judicial vindictiveness occurs occasionally, but is not a serious prob-
lem and has been reduced dramatically by appellate case law).
262. Id. But see FL Public Defender Daniels (expressing dissatisfaction with ap-
pellate oversight of vindictive sentencing); FL Public Defender # 2 ("[A]ppellate courts
can intervene, but it has to be fairly obvious that the judge was using vindictive
sentencing.").
263. See Warner, 762 So. 2d at 514.
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formed judgment about their odds. 2 6 4 Prosecutors have an easier
time predicting the expected minimum in many cases, because judges
are limited in departing downward from the score sheet. But defense
attorneys find it difficult to predict when a judge may sentence their
client near the statutory maximum, because the judge need not give
reasons for upward departures. 265 So when judges state their view
on the case during pre-trial, they help defendants make a more in-
formed plea decision.266 Some practitioners believe this certainty
makes defendants more likely to plead guilty, 2 6 7 and less likely to
appeal subsequently.268
At least in part because it enhances the predictability of plea bar-
gaining, judicial involvement is also seen as more efficient. 269 Some
practitioners believe that judges are more likely than prosecutors to
be under pressure to resolve cases quickly because the Florida Su-
preme Court requires each circuit to report on the size of its
docket. 270 Because judges have a strong interest in moving cases
along, their "participation is usually geared to facilitate progress on a
case."271
Judicial involvement may enhance the fairness of plea negotia-
tions as well. As one defense attorney observed, more experienced
judges have better judgment than young prosecutors who do not
know where a particular case fits within the system and instead try
to "impress the world" by getting a tough sentence. 272 "[Ylou can
make the argument that circuit and county judges are elected to use
their good judgment . . . . Ninety-six percent of cases [in Florida] are
plea-bargained. It's a huge chunk of the cases. It is reasonable for the
264. The score sheet, prepared by the Department of Corrections, is used merely to
guide judges in their sentencing decision. Previously the guidelines set a mandatory
range within which judges had to sentence; today they are merely presumptive.
Judges are free to sentence up to the statutory maximum and can even depart below
the guidelines minimum, but downward departures are subject to appellate review.
Robert Batey & Stephen M. Everhart, The Appeal Provision of Florida's Criminal
Punishment Code: Unwise and Unconstitutional, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5
(1999). Upward departures are only reviewable if they "patently fail to comport with
statutory or constitutional limitations." Hall v. State, 773 So. 2d 99, 100 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2000).
265. FL Public Defender Daniels ("[The] Florida sentencing [scheme] doesn't give
you much certainty ... . You can't ever guarantee to a client that the judge will not go
to the [statutory] maximum. The Sentencing Guidelines were much better because
they narrowed the range . . . .").
266. FL Public Defender # 2.
267. FL Public Defender Daniels ("It's human nature not to want to take risks. You
may want to take a plea if you know for sure you would sit in jail 60 days and then get
probation. Certainty is comforting ...
268. FL Public Defender # 1.
269. E.g., FL Judge # 1 (listing efficiency as the main advantage of judicial partici-
pation); FL Public Defender # 1.
270. FL Public Defender Daniels.
271. FL Public Defender # 2.
272. FL Public Defender Daniels.
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public to expect judges to be involved, rather than to defer to the
judgment of rather inexperienced prosecutors and defenders."273 The
advance review of the plea terms by the judge also makes the bargain
appear fairer to the defendant:
[Involvement by judges in the plea negotiations] can possibly
help with determining whether the plea is voluntary, know-
ing, or whether there is a factual basis . . .. The colloquy is
probably sufficient for that, but it helps somewhat to be in-
volved in advance because the defendant sees the court as
somewhat less hostile than the prosecutor. So the defendant
is more likely to believe it is a fair deal.2 7 4
The "information source" model is fairly limited in promoting
more accurate pleas, however. In theory, advance review of the evi-
dence and the terms of the plea could help the judge determine if a
plea corresponds to the material facts and is voluntarily and know-
ingly made. But in practice, Florida judges rarely probe into the fac-
tual basis of the plea until the plea colloquy itself. At the time of
negotiations, their assessment of the case is based primarily on a
probable cause affidavit submitted by the prosecution and oral state-
ments of facts made by the parties. 275 They are not likely to have a
pre-sentencing report at that time276 and would not have talked to
the witnesses or observed them in deposition, or read the full investi-
gative file in the case. 2 7 7 The judge could learn some of the details by
listening to each side's interpretation of the evidence and asking
questions. Liberal discovery rules in Florida allow both the defense
and the prosecution to have a good grasp of the underlying facts. But
because of the pressure of time, the parties' presentations to the
judge are too brief and informal to educate the judge adequately
about the case. Moreover, plea negotiations often occur at the early
stages of the prosecution, when the evidence has not yet been fully
examined. 278 This lack of information is seen as a major disadvan-
tage of judicial involvement in the negotiations and is what discour-
ages some judges from participating more actively. 279
273. Id.
274. FL Judge # 1.
275. FL Judge # 2; FL Prosecutors # 1 and # 2.
276. Judges will occasionally request a pre-plea sentencing report, but it is done
rarely, because it is perceived as costly and time-consuming. E.g., Telephone Inter-
view, Attorney # 3, State Attorney's Office, 17th Jud. Cir., Florida, Nov. 22, 2005; FL
Judge # 2 (noting that pre-plea reports are rarely ordered and are usually waived by
defendants).
277. FL Public Defender Daniels.
278. FL Public Defender # 1 (stating that some offers are worked out as early as
arraignment).
279. E.g., FL Judge # 3; FL Prosecutor Durden; FL Public Defender Daniels.
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The Florida model of involving judges in plea negotiations has
two other potential disadvantages. First, it may prejudice some
judges as to the outcome of the case because the same judge who is
involved in pretrial negotiations would also preside over the trial and
sentencing of a defendant who rejects the judge's pretrial offer. Prac-
titioners have occasionally observed prejudice when the judge "has an
ego" or is negotiating "in bad faith."28 0 They generally think such
prejudice is the exception, however.281 Second, some judges who
have already made up their mind about the defendant's culpability
may pressure the defendant to plead guilty. As noted earlier, practi-
tioners report that, once in awhile, some judges threaten a harsher
sentence after trial. Such threats undermine the integrity of judicial
involvement in plea bargaining. As some practitioners have sug-
gested, the Florida system may benefit from more rigorous appellate
oversight of judicial behavior.282 Alternatively, Florida may reduce
judicial coerciveness by requiring a different judge to conduct the
trial and sentencing where the defendant withdraws his plea-a
practice that some judges adopt from time to time on their own
initiative.283
Florida's experience with involving judges as an information
source during plea negotiations offers several lessons. First, it con-
firms that increased predictability of outcome is an important benefit
of judicial participation in the negotiations. It also shows that it
might be difficult to limit the judge's role to that of an information
source. Instead of trying to impose such limits, it might be better to
embrace a more active role for judges and provide them with the nec-
essary tools to fulfill that function adequately. Florida judges might
be better able to ensure the fairness and accuracy of the plea if they
were allowed to engage more actively in the plea negotiations and
were provided with ample information about the case. At the same
time, Florida's experience shows the importance of limiting judicial
coercion. More stringent appellate oversight and a rule of changing
judges in cases of plea withdrawals can strengthen the integrity of
judicial involvement in plea negotiations. The next Section describes
how Connecticut has attempted to address some of these issues in a
280. FL Judge # 1 (some judges who have big egos may be prejudiced); FL Public
Defender Daniels (some judges who negotiate in "bad faith" may be prejudiced); see
also FL Public Defender # 1 ("Most judges assume all defendants are guilty. I don't
think [involvement in the negotiations] affects them to any great extent unless the
plea went right up to final disposition and was withdrawn by the defendant.").
281. FL Public Defender # 2 (noting that defense attorneys are given a fair chance
to convince the judge that the defendant might not be guilty); FL Judge # 4 (noting
that judges are not prejudiced because plea bargaining is such a common practice).
But see FL Judge # 3 (noting that it takes a special effort to keep an open mind).
282. FL Public Defender Daniels.
283. FL Judge # 2 (noting that when a backlog of cases has piled up, some judges
may trade cases so that one judge handles all the pretrial matters while the other
handles trials and sentencing).
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system that allows even more active involvement by judges in plea
bargaining.
B. Connecticut: The Judge as an Active Moderator
Connecticut has endorsed more active involvement by judges in
the plea discussions than Florida. In Connecticut, the judge moder-
ates between the parties' positions, and in some cases, directly offers
his views on the plea bargain's merits. This Section argues that the
Connecticut model has several distinct advantages over the federal
model of the judge as a passive verifier and the Florida information
source model. The Connecticut approach not only increases the cer-
tainty in plea bargaining, but also provides the parties with a more
neutral view of the merits of the case, makes the practice more trans-
parent, and better protects against judicial coercion.
1. Revelo and Connecticut Rules on Judicial Participation
The Connecticut Supreme Court has acknowledged that it is
"common practice [in the state] for the presiding criminal judge to
conduct plea negotiations with the parties."284 Judges need not limit
their participation to providing information to the parties-they may
actively attempt to mediate. While Connecticut courts have gener-
ally approved of the open judicial involvement in plea negotiations,
they have repeatedly pointed out the dangers of coercion and the ap-
pearance of impropriety of such participation. 2 8 5 Judges are there-
fore supposed to refrain from "assum[ing] a position of advocacy, real
or apparent."286 They are not allowed to urge the defendant to accept
a plea by suggesting that the exercise of the right to trial would be
punished by a harsher sentence. 287
Like Florida's Supreme Court, Connecticut's highest court has
tried to prevent judicial vindictiveness against defendants who with-
draw their plea bargains. In State v. Revelo, the court held that
judges who participate in plea negotiations cannot threaten to punish
or actually punish a defendant "merely for exercising a statutory or
constitutional right."288 The court explained that judges' actions in
plea negotiations should be held to a higher standard than those of
prosecutors. 289 It noted further that prosecutors have "relatively
equal bargaining power" with the defense, so plea bargaining be-
tween them is based on a "mutuality of advantage"; by contrast, the
284. State v. Revelo, 775 A.2d 260, 268 (Conn. 2001).
285. State v. D'Antonio, 830 A.2d 1187, 1194 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003); State v. Fal-
con, 793 A.2d 274 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
286. State v. Delarosa, 547 A.2d 47, 51 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (discussing standards
of judicial impartiality at trial).




THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
unequal position of the judge and accused "raise[s] a question of fun-
damental fairness."290 If a judge tells the defendant that the exercise
of certain procedural rights would result in a longer sentence, and if
the same judge then imposes a greater sentence when the defendant
exercises his rights, there is a presumption of judicial vindictiveness,
and the court has to explain why a greater sentence is nonetheless
warranted. 291
But Connecticut has gone even further than Florida in safe-
guarding against judicial coercion in the bargaining process. Con-
necticut case law provides that, when the parties and the court fail to
reach an agreement during plea discussions, a judge who was not in-
volved in the plea negotiations and is unaware of the plea terms of-
fered at pre-trial should conduct the trial and post-trial sentencing
phase. 292 Similarly, motions to suppress go to a trial judge different
from the judge who handles the negotiations. This rule aims to pre-
vent judges who perceive a personal stake in the plea agreement from
punishing the defendant for derailing it. It also ensures that the trial
judge is not influenced by any incriminating concessions made during
the plea negotiations. 293
2. Judicial Involvement in Practice
Interviews with Connecticut practitioners confirm that active ju-
dicial involvement in plea negotiations is common and that for the
most part, it occurs within the boundaries set by case law. Although
the defense and the prosecution in Connecticut can meet indepen-
dently to conduct plea negotiations, they often choose to proceed
through judicially moderated plea bargaining. 294 In some districts,
virtually all plea negotiations are conducted in the judge's cham-
bers. 2 9 5 In other districts, most cases involve a judge during pretrial
negotiations; such involvement is especially likely in more serious
cases, where the stakes are higher, and the parties find it more diffi-
cult to come to an agreement. 296 Finally, in less populated districts,
judicial involvement is rare, because it is difficult to find replacement
290. Id.
291. Id. at 273.
292. State v. D'Antonio, 830 A.2d 1187, 1194 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
293. Id.
294. E.g., Telephone Interview with Mike Dearington, State Attorney, New Haven,
Mar. 18, 2005 [hereinafter CT State Attorney Dearington]; Telephone Interview with
John Williams, Defense Attorney, New Haven, June 9, 2005 [hereinafter CT Defense
Attorney Williams].
295. E.g., CT State Attorney Dearington.
296. E.g., Telephone Interview with Prosecutor # 1, Connecticut, June 22, 2005
[hereinafter CT Prosecutor # 1]; Telephone Interview with Mary Miller Haselkamp,




for the pretrial judge who has to recuse himself if the defendant de-
cides not to plead guilty and proceeds to trial.2 9 7
As in Florida, judges in Connecticut become involved in negotia-
tions during pre-trial conferences. Unlike in Florida, however, these
conferences usually occur in the judge's chambers and are not offi-
cially recorded, though both parties and the judge take notes of the
conversations. 298 The first time the parties meet with the judge, the
prosecutor presents a brief summary of the case, and the defense at-
torney is entitled to respond. The prosecutor may also file a probable
cause document, and less frequently, the defense may file a psychiat-
ric evaluation or a drug dependence assessment. 299 But most of the
evidence is presented orally by the parties.300 Since the defense often
lacks the full facts of the case at the early stages of the case, the
defense attorney regularly requests a continuance to obtain discovery
(Connecticut provides for liberal discovery from the prosecutor).30 1 It
is common for the judge to grant five to six pretrial continuances, for
three-four weeks each, to allow the defense to get up to speed on the
case and to investigate the facts independently. 302
The judge's role during pretrial is best described as that of a me-
diator or moderator. As one prosecutor explained, "[Judges] listen to
the description and the pitch from each side and they suggest to ei-
ther side that they are being unreasonable and tell them things they
should consider."303 A defense attorney observed that judges are
likely to be especially active when they think a case is not worth a lot
of time in court-for example, where the prosecution is reluctant to
bargain mainly because the complaining party is "politically con-
nected or unusually vocal."304 At the end of the back-and-forth be-
tween the parties and the judge, the judge usually states the
expected sentence after a plea.3 0 5 Sometimes, the judge will also of-
fer an estimate of the post-trial sentence-but since a different judge
would be imposing that sentence in the case of a plea withdrawal, the
297. E.g., Telephone Interview with State Attorney, Connecticut, Nov. 9, 2005
[hereinafter CT Prosecutor # 3].
298. Practitioners generally agree that the lack of an official record encourages
candor. E.g., CT Prosecutor # 1; CT Defense Attorney Williams.
299. Telephone Interview, Attorney # 1, Office of the Public Defender, New Haven,
Sept. 28, 2005 [hereinafter CT Public Defender # 11.
300. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor # 2, Connecticut, June 22, 2005 [herein-
after CT Prosecutor # 2]; CT Public Defender Haselkamp.
301. CT State Attorney Dearington; see also William F. Dow, III, Shall We Gather
at the River?, NEW HAVEN CouNTY B. Ass'N, Feb. 2002, at 4, at http://www.
newhavenbar.org/files/MarCols-Feb_02.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).
302. CT State Attorney Dearington.
303. CT Prosecutor # 1.
304. CT Defense Attorney Williams.
305. E.g., CT Prosecutor # 1 (may be a sentence range, a cap, or a fixed sentence,
but a fixed sentence is most common); Telephone Interview with Karen Goodrow,
Public Defender, Tolland Judicial District, Connecticut, Nov. 4, 2005 [hereinafter CT
Public Defender Goodrow].
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pre-trial judge's estimate is not necessarily more accurate than that
of the parties.306 At the same time, it is perceived as more neutral
and may help in mediating the discussion.307
What is unique about Connecticut practice in some districts is
that several attorneys are invited to come in and observe the negotia-
tions as they wait their turn for a pretrial meeting.a08 One New Ha-
ven attorney has called these pretrial meetings "group participation
events"-"somewhere between a group therapy session on the one
hand and a Penology 101 seminar on the other."309 The lawyers sit-
ting by often contribute alternative ideas and perspectives as plea
negotiations take place in front of them.310 Most importantly, they
learn the "going rate" for plea bargains, and their presence lends
credibility to the system.311
According to one source, such judicial involvement in plea negoti-
ations began occurring regularly fifteen to twenty years ago, after
New Haven prosecutors stopped plea bargaining in protest against
judges who were undercutting their offers.312 To eliminate the back-
log created from the prosecutors' refusal to plea bargain, judges be-
gan bargaining directly with the defense attorneys.313 The
prosecutors were invited to join these chamber conversations as well,
and if they refused to participate, they could "watch as their cases
were bargained away."3 14 Soon thereafter, other lawyers were in-
vited to the pretrial discussions, to ensure the transparency of the
process. Today Connecticut practitioners generally favor the group
format of the bargaining discussions because it reaffirms the credibil-
ity of the process.315
The rule requiring a judge to recuse herself after participating in
plea negotiations is also seen as key to the legitimacy of the sys-
tem.3 1 6 One interviewee worried that the rule is occasionally
306. CT Prosecutor # 1; CT Defense Attorney Williams (judges give a vague esti-
mate, but cannot predict the sentence). But see Questionnaire, Judge # 2, Connecticut
[hereinafter CT Judge # 2] (judges do not comment on the post-trial sentence); CT
Prosecutor # 2; CT Public Defender # 1.
307. CT Prosecutor # 1. Because the negotiations usually occur in chambers, with-
out the defendant being present, a statement of the post-trial sentence cannot directly
coerce the defendant. But sometimes, though rarely, a judge might note the possibil-
ity of a longer post-trial sentence in open court in order to directly urge the defendant
to plead guilty. See CT Public Defender Haselkamp.
308. CT State Attorney Dearington; CT Defense Attorney Williams.
309. Dow, supra note 301, at 4.
310. Id.
311. CT State Attorney Dearington.
312. Dow, supra note 301, at 4. Other studies point to even earlier judicial partici-
pation in plea negotiations, dating back to at least the late 1970s. HEUMANN, supra
note 208, at 147.
313. Dow, supra note 301, at 4.
314. Id.




breached in practice, whereby a pretrial judge may lobby the sentenc-
ing judge on the same case to give the defendant a harsher sentence
for rejecting the pretrial offer.317 According to the same interviewee,
although such conduct occurs rarely, it sets the tone for the negotia-
tions and undermines the credibility of the process.318 Other inter-
viewees contested that possibility.319 One prosecutor pointed out
that, in about one-fourth of cases, post-trial sentences are the same
as or lower than the pre-trial offers, which suggests that judges are
not punishing defendants for rejecting plea offers. 320
Even if occasionally a defendant might receive a lower sentence
post-trial than upon a guilty plea, in a large majority of cases, the
post-trial sentence is higher.321 While practitioners disagree about
the acceptability of a large sentence differential between the post-
plea and post-trial sentence, 322 they agree that such a differential is
common. 323 To make that point, the New Haven State Attorney gave
an example of a person recently accused of committing sexual assault
on a minor. The pretrial offer by the judge had been four years
served, but the defendant chose to go to trial and received 35 years
upon conviction. 324 The government sees this as the cost of imposing
on a child victim the burden of testifying about his traumatic experi-
ence at trial.325 The sentence can hardly be seen as vindictive, as the
judge who imposed the post-trial sentence was unaware of the differ-
ential between the ultimate sentence and the one offered by the pre-
trial judge. In practice, neither the appellate courts not the Sentence
Review Division of Connecticut's Superior Court 3 2 6 are likely to inter-
vene to strike down a post-trial sentence simply because it is far
317. CT Defense Attorney Williams.
318. Id.
319. E.g., CT Prosecutor # 1; CT Public Defender Haselkamp.
320. CT Prosecutor # 1; CT Public Defender Haselkamp.
321. CT State Attorney Dearington; CT Prosecutor # 1 (noting that in about 75
percent of cases the trial sentence is likely to be higher than the pretrial offer); CT
Prosecutor # 2 (observing that whether someone receives a higher sentence depends
on the sentencing judge).
322. CT Prosecutor # 1 ("There is always an element of coercion in the fact that the
post-trial sentence will be higher, but I don't think that it's improper coercion . . . . I
think we take our obligation to do justice pretty seriously; if we thought the person
was innocent, we would not be looking for a plea."); cf. CT Prosecutor # 2 (acknowledg-
ing that innocent people may plead guilty, but noting that this is due to the large plea
discounts).
323. CT Prosecutor # 1 (gives as an example a differential between 8 and 20 years,
but notes that it could be higher or lower depending on the case); CT Prosecutor # 2
(gives examples of differentials between 6 and 40 years and between 3 and 25 years);
CT Defense Attorney Williams (noting that the differential is hard to gauge, but that
the post-trial sentence is at least twice as high as the pretrial offer).
324. CT State Attorney Dearington.
325. Id.
326. Connecticut appellate courts may review a sentence only for abuse of discre-
tion. State v. Baldwin, 618 A.2d 513 (Conn. 1993). The normal course for challenging
a sentence is through a petition for review to the Sentence Review Division of the
Superior Court. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-195 (West 2005).
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higher than the pretrial offer.3 2 7 One defense attorney reported that
the Sentence Review Division is "appalled when a defense attorney
dares to raise the issue."328
While the large differential may on its own terms raise questions
about the coerciveness of plea negotiations, this problem would exist
whether the judge is involved or not.3 2 9 It is especially serious
where, as in Connecticut, no guidelines help the parties estimate the
post-plea and post-trial sentence. Defendants know they are likely to
be sentenced more harshly after trial, but they do not know how
much more harshly-so they plead guilty to avoid the risk.330 Simi-
larly, a prosecutor may agree to a sentence that is too lenient because
the judge's disposition of the case is uncertain. Therefore, by reduc-
ing the uncertainty facing the parties, judicial input in the negotia-
tions also decreases the coerciveness of plea bargaining and is
consistent with the public interest in proportionate sentencing.331
3. Evaluating the Connecticut Model
One of the key virtues of the Connecticut system is that, in com-
parison to the federal system, it gives the parties a better sense of the
possible outcomes of the plea negotiations and of trial. In the absence
of any sentencing guidelines, the parties are eager to learn first-hand
from the judge what plea bargain would be acceptable to the court.332
Involving the judge early in the negotiations responds to that need.
As noted earlier, the increased certainty allows both sides to make a
more intelligent plea decision. It reduces the danger that either side
might enter into a plea deal simply due to a miscalculation of the
expected sentence.
Some predictability regarding the post-trial outcome is lost as a
result of the requirement that a different judge preside over trial and
sentencing where plea negotiations break down. Because of that
rule, the judge moderating the negotiations cannot accurately predict
what sentence would be imposed if the case goes to trial. This reduc-
tion in predictability may be a reasonable tradeoff for the decrease in
judicial coercion that results from the recusal requirement. Thanks
to the recusal rule, defendants do not have to fear that if they with-
327. E.g., CT Prosecutor # 3.
328. CT Defense Attorney Williams ("I had a case of marital rape ... and during
trial, my client was offered four years, and he did not take it. He received 24 years
after trial. The Sentencing Review Division was horrified, but it was not because of
the disparity; it was horrified that I mentioned it.").
329. E.g., CT Prosecutor # 1 (any coerciveness that exists is independent of judicial
involvement).
330. CT Defense Attorney Williams.
331. Cf. Questionnaire, Judge # 3, Connecticut, Oct. 21, 2005 [hereinafter CT
Judge # 3] (involving judges in the negotiations is more likely to reduce coercion cre-
ated by sentencing uncertainty).
332. E.g., CT Defense Attorney Williams; CT Prosecutor # 3.
252 [Vol. 54
PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
draw from the plea discussions and choose to go to trial, they would
be punished at trial by the judge whose pretrial offers they rejected.
All but one of the interviewees from Connecticut agreed that the
recusal rule is an effective way to curb judicial coercion in plea nego-
tiations. The one interviewee who disagreed based his opinion on a
perception that the recusal rule is not followed in practice, not that it
is unwise in principle.333
The interviewees also perceived the Connecticut system of judi-
cial participation as more efficient than systems where the judge re-
mains passive.334 They believe the parties are more likely to agree
on a disposition early in the process and are less likely to appeal af-
terward.33 5 Judicial involvement therefore saves the system the
costs of re-negotiation or appeals of the plea.3 3 6 Of course, efficiency
is not an unqualified good. The emphasis on efficiency by some
judges might come at the expense of other goals of the criminal jus-
tice system, such as ensuring a fair and accurate outcome. Although
the emphasis on efficiency may at times conflict with fairness and
accuracy, this tradeoff is largely inherent in plea bargaining. The
question is whether active judicial participation further undermines
or instead enhances accuracy and fairness.
One prosecutor and one defense attorney expressed a worry that
judges are more concerned than prosecutors about the size of the
docket.33 7 According to one defense attorney, the docket statistics
are very important for the judges' internal evaluations and for their
rotation appointments. 338 This concern may prompt judges to speed
up the resolution of a case at the expense of fairness. The same de-
fense attorney opined that, as a result of this emphasis on efficiency,
"[tihe system is seen as corrupt by almost all defense attorneys. The
perception of justice is severely affected. There is a perception that
judges are just rushing a case through."339 But others disagree with
this assessment of the judges' work. As a prosecutor interviewee
noted, "[The judge's motivation is] to make sure that the defendant is
treated fairly and receives a just sentence. I have not seen a judge do
333. CT Defense Attorney Williams.
334. E.g., CT State Attorney Dearington; CT Defense Attorney Williams. Cf. CT
Prosecutor # 2 Interview (agreeing that the practice is generally more efficient be-
cause it encourages defendants to plead earlier and to appeal less, but pointing out
that it is very labor-intensive for the judge).
335. CT Prosecutor # 2.
336. Questionnaire, Judge # 1, Connecticut, Aug. 24, 2005 [hereinafter CT Judge #
1].
337. CT Prosecutor # 1 (listing as the main disadvantage of judicial participation
that judges may be motivated too much by concerns such as docket size and, to a
lesser degree, prison overcrowding); CT Defense Attorney Williams.
338. CT Defense Attorney Williams.
339. Id.
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anything other than that."3 4 0 Judges themselves are also unlikely to
perceive their involvement as sacrificing fairness for efficiency; a
judge interviewee asserted that the judge's motivation is above all "to
see that justice is served for all parties involved, the state, the de-
fense, and the public, including any victims." 3 4 1 The reality may re-
flect a bit of both of these contrasting viewpoints-a small number of
judges may sometimes rush through a plea bargain without heeding
all the facts available-but this seems to be the exception, rather
than the rule.3 4 2
While the views differ as to the extent to which judges may be
more likely than prosecutors to sacrifice fairness for efficiency, there
is broad agreement that the active involvement of an impartial third
party in the plea negotiations makes its own contribution to the fair-
ness of the process. As an independent arbiter, the judge can temper
the bargaining positions of both overzealous prosecutors and overcon-
fident defendants. As one prosecutor noted, "The biggest function of
judicial involvement is in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of
the case. It is a more objective view. The judge could suggest to one
side or another [to change their position]."343 Other interviewees
concurred that pretrial judges evaluate the relative strengths and
weaknesses of both sides' cases and point to problems that each
might have if the case goes to trial.3 4 4 Some policymakers in Con-
necticut concur that judicial participation is needed as a check on the
plea bargaining process. 345 In the presence of a judge, a prosecutor is
less likely to attempt to bully the defense during negotiations, but
also less likely to give in too easily to an unreasonable defense offer
so as to dispose of the case more quickly. At the same time, the
judge's involvement may be valuable to defendants who would refuse
a reasonable bargain simply because they mistrust the prosecutor,
yet would accept the same offer if it came from the judge.346 Or the
judge may encourage the defense attorney to explore alternatives to
incarceration. 347 All of this influence is subtle-the judge cannot co-
340. CT Prosecutor # 2; see also Questionnaire, Prosecutor # 4, Connecticut, Oct.
31, 2005 [hereinafter CT Prosecutor # 4].
341. CT Judge # 1; see also CT Judges # 2 and # 3.
342. E.g., CT Public Defender Haselkamp; CT Prosecutor # 3 (noting that some-
times docket pressure leads judges to sentence more leniently).
343. CT Prosecutor # 1; see also CT Prosecutor # 2 (pointing out as one of the main
advantages of the practice that "judges are able to talk freely in chambers and point
out weaknesses and strength of cases and bring the lawyers around"); CT Public De-
fender Goodrow.
344. E.g., CT Judges # 1 and # 2; CT Public Defender Haselkamp.
345. Kellie A. Wagner, Judge Rebuffed for Role in Plea Bargain, CoNN. L. TRiB.,
Oct. 6, 2003, at 1 (quoting Michael Lawlor, co-chairman of the Judiciary Committee of
the Connecticut legislature).
346. E.g., CT Prosecutor # 3; CT Public Defender Haselkamp.
347. CT Defense Attorney Williams.
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erce a defendant to plead guilty and cannot dismiss a case simply as a
means of docket control.
As an impartial mediator, the judge can also better ensure that
the plea adequately reflects the facts of the case, even where lawyers
fail in their representation. For example, the judge can refuse to ac-
cept a bargain where she sees that the defendant is misinformed or
induced to enter into a bargain by an incompetent defense attorney or
an attorney who is too quick to urge her clients to plead (for instance,
where the attorney is paid per case or is otherwise overburdened with
work).348 The judge can also refuse to acquiesce to a bargain dis-
torted by a prosecutor's lack of competence or eagerness to dispose of
a case as quickly as possible in order to reduce an unbearable wor-
kload.349 At the very least, the judge can and does "keep both parties
honest," prodding each side to produce information that the other
side has lawfully requested.350
For the judge to step into this active role, however, he or she
must be familiar with the facts of the case. Connecticut rules require
a factual basis for guilty pleas, and judges inquire into the factual
basis by hearing the parties' summaries of the case. Although the
court can order a thorough pretrial sentence investigation by the pro-
bation office, financial and time pressures weigh against it, and the
judge rarely has a full record at her disposal that could help her
check the parties' stories.351 Furthermore, pretrial negotiations
sometimes occur before the investigation and discovery have en-
ded. 3 5 2 The judge often prods the prosecution to investigate fur-
ther.3 5 3 But ultimately, even when a judge tells the prosecution that
its evidence is too weak, the prosecution may simply disagree and go
348. E.g., CT Public Defender Goodrow (noting that even pro-prosecutor judges try
to help inexperienced attorneys to make sure that client will not be harmed); see also
Bibas, supra note 15, at 2543.
349. Cf. CT Public Defender # 1 (noting that judges are more likely to intervene
where prosecutors are off-base because of lack of experience); CT Prosecutor # 1 (not-
ing that judges may tell the prosecutors they do not have a good case).
350. CT Public Defender Haselkamp.
351. CT Public Defender Goodrow (noting that courts order pre-sentencing report
only where they have agreed to a sentence cap, but will not commit to a specific sen-
tence until reviewing the report); CT Judge # 1 (noting that the court has the benefit
of a pretrial sentence investigation by probation, but that normally, the court relies
only on oral presentations by the parties); CT Prosecutor # 3 (stating that a report is
ordered by the court very rarely, but sometimes the defense hires its own private
investigators to obtain the same information). But see CT Prosecutor # 4 (stating that
a pre-sentence report is the tool that judges use during pretrial plea discussions).
352. E.g., CT Prosecutor # 1; CT Public Defender # 1. But see CT Prosecutor # 2
(noting that some cases take a number of pretrial conferences until the investigation
is complete, but that the prosecution would not negotiate until they have completed
the investigation).
353. E.g., CT Judge # 1; CT Defense Attorney Williams.
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forward with the case. 3 5 4 To that extent, judges' ability to remedy
the lawyers' failures remains limited. It is therefore not surprising
that judges' questions during pretrial tend to focus on the appropri-
ate sentence rather than on the factual basis for the plea.3 5 5
As the analysis of the German model of judicial participation
suggested, it is possible to provide judges with more thorough infor-
mation about the case and the defendant, whether in the form of a
complete investigative file or in the form of a pre-sentencing report.
Such information may be an essential element in entrusting judges
with the responsibility of supervising the accuracy of plea bargains.
V. A NEW ROLE FOR JUDGES IN PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
The review of different models of judicial involvement in plea ne-
gotiations reveals that, if properly structured, such involvement can
have three important benefits:
1) increasing the predictability of plea bargaining;
2) enhancing the accuracy and fairness of the plea; and
3) introducing more openness and transparency in the plea
negotiations.
Although none of the jurisdictions examined here does so perfectly,
each has valuable features that can be incorporated into a model that
moves closer to these goals. This Part sketches an outline for such a
model, building on insights from the way plea bargaining operates in
Florida, Connecticut and Germany. Several of the practices that ap-
pear useful were anticipated by Albert Alschuler 30 years ago in an
article defending judicial participation in plea negotiations.356
The model set forth here could be particularly useful in federal
courts, where judicial involvement is currently prohibited. The un-
certainty created by the end of mandatory guidelines in the federal
system, the high number of guilty pleas, as well as the concern that
some of these pleas are not fair or accurate makes the federal system
a good candidate for judicial intervention into the plea negotiations.
Moreover, the federal system has already assigned magistrates with
the similar function of managing settlement negotiations in the con-
text of civil cases. Federal magistrates might therefore be able to
play a greater role in plea negotiations as well. State systems may
also find that judicial involvement will enhance the fairness of their
354. CT Defense Attorney Williams (noting that this is what the prosecution usu-
ally does). But see CT Public Defender Haselkamp (noting that the prosecution usu-
ally dismisses the case).
355. See CT Public Defender # 1; cf. CT Prosecutor # 2 (judges often do not deter-
mine the factual basis until the plea colloquy); CT Judge # 3.
356. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1122-48.
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plea bargaining practices. Many of the features discussed here would
be equally applicable to state practices.
A. Informed Bargains
Judicial involvement in plea negotiations offers an early and
more reliable estimate of the expected post-plea, and in some cases,
post-trial sentence. As discussed earlier, this increased predictability
helps ensure that the plea bargain is informed, voluntary, and fair.
This Section will outline a procedure for judicial involvement that is
more likely to produce informed plea bargains.
As in all three jurisdictions-Florida, Connecticut, and Ger-
many-the process could begin with a pretrial conference, in which
the prosecution and defense would each tell the judge their interpre-
tation of the facts. The prosecution would go first in presenting its
side, setting a ceiling for the plea offer. The defense may then contest
the facts, offer facts in mitigation, and potentially propose its own
bargain terms. Depending on the facts, the judge may ask further
questions, attempt to mediate, or simply inform the parties what he
or she considers an acceptable sentencing range.
The judge could further assist the parties by providing several
pieces of information. As in all three systems discussed here, the
judge could be permitted to advise the defendant of the expected post-
plea sentence. The judge may do this "on the spot," if he has previ-
ously had enough time to consider the evidence, or he could take the
parties' positions into consideration and make his position known at
a later hearing. In any event, this early assessment of acceptable
plea terms would allow the parties to make a more informed decision
and would reduce the rate of bargain renegotiations and appeals.
The discussion of each side's position at the pretrial stage would also
help the judge herself come to a more educated sentencing
decision. 357
A related question is whether the judge should be allowed to
comment on possible post-trial outcomes. Florida law prohibits com-
ments about the post-trial sentence because of their potential for co-
erciveness, and Florida judges have generally complied with the ban.
In Germany and Connecticut, judges are more open to discussing the
expected sentence after trial, though they also have to guard the lan-
guage they use so as not to appear to coerce the defendant into plead-
ing guilty. In part, the willingness of Connecticut and German
judges to speculate on a post-trial sentence is a function of the broad
357. See Allen F. Anderson, Judicial Participation in the Plea Negotiation Process:
Some Frequencies and Disposing Factors, 10 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 39, 46 (1989)
(conducting a study of North Carolina judges' involvement in plea negotiations and
finding that judges become increasingly involved primarily to "get more complete in-
formation to render an adequate sentence").
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discretion they possess over sentencing. Unlike Florida, neither Con-
necticut nor Germany has ever had a system of sentencing guide-
lines. The greater the uncertainty of the sentencing regime, the more
eager defendants are to hear from the real decision-maker, the judge,
about the outcome facing them if they decide to exercise their right to
trial. Naturally, if judges perceive that the defense is interested in
hearing about the expected post-trial sentence, they are more likely
to comment on it.
The question of judicial comments on the post-trial sentence
reveals an inevitable tension between enhancing predictability and
avoiding coercive plea bargains. Because Germany, Connecticut and
Florida all reward guilty pleas with sentencing discounts, post-trial
sentences are generally longer than post-plea sentences. For that
reason, an accurate statement of the post-trial sentence by the judge
may well sound threatening and seem coercive to a defendant. But
the coercion in this case stems not from any bad faith on part of the
judge, but from the sentencing structure that encourages plea bar-
gaining through substantial sentence discounts. Allowing judges to
provide assessments of the post-trial sentence, as they do in Germany
and in Connecticut, is not likely to have any independent coercive
effect on the defendant.35 8 On the contrary, in some instances it may
diminish the coercive influence of our sentencing schemes by narrow-
ing the range between the expected post-trial and post-plea
sentences.
When defendants make a decision to plead guilty, they assess not
only the difference in sentencing length after a plea and after trial,
but also the odds that they would be convicted at trial. So another
way in which judges can help ensure that pleas are informed is by
providing a neutral assessment of the parties' positions. Judges in
Connecticut and Germany are freer to provide information on the
merits of the case than their counterparts in Florida, and they use
their discretion to steer the parties toward reasonable and fair plea
terms. Such involvement may prevent prosecutorial bluffing, and it
may encourage an overconfident defendant to accept a reasonable of-
fer. Connecticut interviewees consistently pointed to the judge's
evenhanded assessment of the merits of the case as one of the chief
advantages of judicial participation in the negotiations.
Judges should therefore be permitted to comment on the merits
of the case as a way of providing a neutral assessment of the evidence
and helping the parties reach a fair agreement. Because there are
special risks of coercion arising from such comments, as Section D
358. Unless, of course, judges use language that aims to coerce the defendant. But




elaborates, it is also important to consider procedural safeguards to
minimize undue pressure.
B. Truthful Bargains
Providing sentence information and a neutral assessment of the
merits of the case is already a significant step toward increasing the
fairness of plea bargaining. But judicial participation can offer even
more. Judges can also make a significant contribution to the accu-
racy of plea bargaining outcomes.
Consider the example of German judges, who enter the plea bar-
gaining process with a full awareness that their responsibility to seek
the truth does not cease when a case is resolved in a consensual fash-
ion. The American analogue to this responsibility could be a more
probing "factual basis" inquiry, which would occur in the process of
judge-mediated plea negotiations rather than at the plea colloquy.
Requiring judges to inquire more thoroughly into the facts of the case
early, before the parties have agreed on a version of the facts, could
minimize the chances that the plea terms are unduly harsh, unduly
lenient, or otherwise misrepresent the facts.
A judge who questions the factual basis of the plea could advise
the parties that the court would not accept a plea based on the facts
presented at the plea conference (or as discussed later in this Section,
based on a pre-plea investigation report prepared by a probation of-
ficer). Two possibilities exist at this stage. The case could proceed to
trial, or it could be dismissed. When a judge conducts a factual basis
review and concludes that evidence to support the plea is insufficient,
it would seem unlikely that the case would proceed to trial. This is
because the factual basis is understood to be a lower standard of
proof than that for a directed verdict of acquittal. It would seem both
unfair and illogical that a defendant whose guilty plea has been re-
jected for lacking factual basis is later convicted by a jury and faces a
harsher sentence after trial.
Of course, there is the possibility that the prosecution has simply
not been able to gather enough evidence during the plea negotiations.
Before dismissing a case that lacks factual basis, therefore, a judge
might give the prosecution more time to gather evidence. But ulti-
mately, the prosecution should not try to negotiate cases where it
lacks evidence to support a factual basis for the plea. And because
double jeopardy would not have attached at this point, if the judge
dismisses the case, the prosecution would be free to re-indict the de-
fendant later if it gathers new evidence.
In reality, judges already play a similar role in Connecticut, but
they do so much more informally. If they find that the facts are insuf-
ficient to support a guilty plea, they recommend that the prosecutor
gather further evidence. This is enough to prod most prosecutors to
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act, and when they cannot collect more evidence, to dismiss the case.
Although judges would not always grant a motion to dismiss at that
point, prosecutors have reason to worry that unless they support
their case with further evidence, the court may direct a verdict of ac-
quittal at the end of the prosecution's case-in-chief.
If active investigation of the truth is to become a principal re-
sponsibility of judges who participate in plea negotiations, judges
need to be provided with adequate tools to fulfill that responsibility.
Germany can serve as a model in this respect. As discussed in Part
II, a complete file of the investigation is available to both the judge
and the defense prior to plea negotiations in Germany. All partici-
pants in the negotiations therefore come to the bargaining table well-
equipped to assess the fairness and accuracy of proposed plea terms.
Connecticut and Florida also provide for liberal discovery prior to the
plea, although the judge does not receive all of the information avail-
able to the parties.359 Still, liberal pre-plea disclosure to the defense
ensures that the judge's input will not be distorted by a one-sided
presentation of the evidence by the prosecution.360
Requiring full pre-plea disclosure might be seen as a significant
departure from the current law in many jurisdictions, including the
federal system. Under present interpretations of due process re-
quirements for disclosure, the prosecution is required to turn over
only material, factually exculpatory evidence prior to a guilty plea.
At the same time, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require
the prosecution, upon request, to turn over specified evidence mate-
rial to the preparation of the defense, and many federal prosecutors
on their own initiative turn over more evidence to encourage the de-
fendant to plead guilty. It is not radical to propose, therefore, that
unless witness intimidation or destruction of the evidence is a con-
cern, the prosecution should open its files to the defense early in the
process, and certainly before the plea colloquy. This disclosure ought
to apply to items material to the defense not only at trial, but also at
sentencing.
The evidence gathered by the prosecution could also be provided
directly to the judge before the negotiations, as is the practice in Ger-
many. Such disclosure would enable judges to evaluate indepen-
dently the factual basis of the case before the plea conference and to
intervene when the prosecutor and the defense attorney fail in their
representation during the negotiations. This kind of disclosure raises
none of the concerns about witness intimidation or evidence destruc-
tion that liberal pre-plea discovery to the defense might.
An alternative method of informing the judge, suggested by Al-
bert Alschuler, is to require probation officers to prepare a pre-sen-
359. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86 (West 2005); FIA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220.
360. Eleanor J. Ostrow, The Case for Preplea Disclosure, 90 YALE L.J. 1581 (1981).
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tencing report before the plea discussions.361 Probation reports can
already be requested by Florida and Connecticut courts during pre-
trial.3 6 2 Unfortunately, they are rarely used at that early stage, be-
cause they are costly and take a long time to prepare.363 But if these
reports would be prepared before sentencing in any event, it would
not be significantly more costly to prepare them earlier in the pro-
cess. The only additional cost might be incurred in cases where the
defendant ultimately decides not to plead guilty-but that cost would
be minimal and would be outweighed by the benefit that probation
reports carry in informing the plea bargaining process.
If the preparation of a probation report early in the process is
perceived as too time-consuming and costly, legislatures could simply
require disclosure to the judge of the same evidence that the parties
would receive under liberal discovery rules. Oral summaries of the
evidence by the parties during the plea conference would still supple-
ment the written documents, and the judge could clarify much of the
factual basis through direct questions to the parties at the confer-
ence. But where ambiguities arise, the judge should be able, before
and during the negotiations, to consult the investigative files and any
supplemental documents filed by the defense.
C. Transparent Bargains
Another important element that ought to accompany judicial in-
volvement in plea negotiations is transparency. Transparency could
strengthen the public legitimacy of plea bargaining and ensure that
the outcomes of plea bargaining are consistent with public views of
blameworthiness. It can also justify plea bargaining to victims, who
often distrust negotiations behind closed doors, especially because
the secretive negotiations frequently result in a sentence signifi-
cantly shorter than the expected post-trial sentence.364
With respect to transparency, the German model largely falls
short, whereas the Connecticut and Florida models fare better. As
mentioned earlier, despite the emphasis on publicity by the German
Federal Supreme Court, the record of the plea negotiations includes
only the outcome of the negotiations. Although lay judges provide
some public oversight into negotiations that stretch into the main
proceedings, their lack of access to the investigative file, combined
with the general distrust of their abilities by the professional judges,
361. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1146.
362. Telephone Interview with Judge # 2, Florida, Circuit Court, Aug. 29, 2005
[hereinafter FL Judge # 2]; Questionnaire, Judge # 1, Connecticut, Aug. 24, 2005
[hereinafter CT Judge # 1]; Telephone Interview with Attorney # 3, State Attorney's
Office, 17th Jud. Cir., Florida, Nov. 22, 2005 [hereinafter FL Prosecutor # 3].
363. FL Judge # 2 (noting that the long preparation time conflicts with judges' aim
to dispose of cases as quickly as possible).
364. E.g., Interview # 10, Landgericht Judge, Berlin.
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means that their input is insignificant. The comfort that German
lawyers have with ex parte communications with the judge further
exacerbates the problem.365
Florida and Connecticut may handle this issue better. Florida
law requires that all plea discussions with judges be on the record,366
although anecdotal evidence suggests that judges sometimes ignore
this requirement, even at the risk of reversal.36 7 Some Connecticut
courts ensure a level of transparency through their unique format of
group plea bargaining, where a number of defense attorneys and
prosecutors are present at the plea negotiation conference with the
judge. Connecticut also allows a victim's advocate to participate in
plea negotiations where the case concerns serious injuries or personal
losses.368
Yet the most transparency-friendly proposal comes from Albert
Alschuler, who has recommended that a stenographic transcript be
made of all the pretrial plea discussions involving the judge.369 A
record of negotiations has clear benefits in that it reduces coercion
and strengthens the public legitimacy of plea bargaining. Requiring
a record of plea negotiations also allows appellate courts to identify
biased and coercive remarks more easily and to develop clear limits
on judicial involvement in plea bargaining. But a full stenographic
record is costly and burdensome. As some practitioners have pointed
out, it may also discourage candor and reduce the information that
the judge provides to the parties. For that reason, a record should be
made available only when requested by the parties or the judge. This
is the practice with respect to judge-mediated settlement discussions
in civil cases,370 and it strikes the right balance between trans-
parency, on the one hand, and efficiency and candid negotiations, on
the other.
D. Avoiding Coerced Bargains
As discussed earlier, the main concern in structuring a system of
judicial plea bargaining is that judges may form premature conclu-
sions about cases and pressure defendants to plead guilty. Although
case law consistently emphasizes the perils of judicial coercion, in
practice, few practitioners from Florida and Connecticut seem to con-
sider coercion by judges a serious problem. For that reason, it is
worth considering the structural safeguards that these jurisdictions
365. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
366. State v. Warner, 762 So. 2d 507, 514 (Fla. 2000).
367. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
368. CT Judge # 1. Some Florida judges also allow victims to be present at the
pretrial conference. FL Prosecutor # 3.
369. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1148.
370. E.g., Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason, Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2002).
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have adopted in order to minimize any existing or apparent undue
influence.
Appellate courts in Florida monitor judicial remarks closely for
evidence of threats of harsh treatment during plea discussions.
Where a judge initiates the plea discussions and makes comments
that tie the expected sentence to the defendant's exercise of legiti-
mate procedural choices, appellate courts may grant a motion to dis-
qualify the judge for partiality.37 ' Appellate courts may also vacate a
post-trial sentence where it is more severe than the sentence offered
pre-trial, and no reasonable explanation for the disparity is given.372
Several Florida practitioners interviewed for this study emphasized
that appellate case law on judicial vindictiveness has dramatically
reduced judicial coercion.373 A strict standard of reviewing judicial
remarks in the context of plea discussions would therefore be a good
component of any system that involves judges in plea negotiations.
Florida case law also prohibits judges from initiating plea discus-
sions. If a defendant wants to plead guilty, he has to request a plea
conference at which both the prosecutor and the judge would be pre-
sent. Judicial initiation of this process adds minimal value, perhaps
by expediting pretrial consideration of a plea bargain. But the inter-
est in minimizing even the appearance of judicial coercion clearly out-
weighs this marginal efficiency gain. For that reason, it would be
best to leave the decision to start negotiations to the defendant.374
Connecticut has implemented what appears to be the most effec-
tive safeguard against judicial coercion. When a defendant decides
not to plead guilty or withdraws his plea, Connecticut case law re-
quires that he be tried and sentenced by a judge other than the one
involved in the plea discussions.375 Connecticut practitioners see this
arrangement as essential to the credibility of the system.3 76 Just as
it limits judicial coercion, however, the Connecticut practice of
switching judges in the case of a plea withdrawal may disturb the
predictability of plea bargaining. Assigning the case to a second
judge in the case of a plea withdrawal means that the first judge can-
not offer a reliable prognosis of what the post-trial sentence will be.
The rule is also difficult to implement in small districts, where only
371. Pierce v. Florida, 873 So. 2d 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
372. Wilson v. State, 845 So. 2d 142, 156 (Fla. 2003).
373. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
374. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1146.
375. State v. Revelo, 775 A.2d 260, 268 (Conn. 2001). A similar system of judge
rotation has been used by the city of Detroit. It is less likely to minimize coercion,
however, because it provides trial judges with a record of the sentence offered to de-
fendants by pretrial judges. Defendants who reject that offer and proceed to trial are
therefore practically assured to receive a higher sentence. Stephanie Baron, Com-
ment, Pretrial Sentence Bargaining: A Cure for Crowded Dockets?, 30 EMORY L.J. 853,
880-90 (1981).
376. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
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one judge is available.377 Finally, the practice may be less efficient,
because in the event of a plea withdrawal, the second judge needs to
become newly acquainted with the case. At the same time, plea with-
drawals are not as likely to occur where the parties know in advance
what plea bargain would be acceptable to the judge, so the loss in
efficiency may be insignificant.
A system that endorses judicial participation must take special
care to display a serious commitment to judicial integrity. Even the
appearance of partiality or coerciveness could undermine one of the
key benefits of judicial involvement-its tendency to enhance the
fairness and legitimacy of plea bargaining. For that reason, a fair
system of judicial participation should adopt both the Florida and
Connecticut safeguards against coercion. Pretrial judges would be
prohibited from initiating plea discussions on their own. Appellate
courts would be vigilant against express or implied threats by judges
in the course of plea negotiations. And where a defendant decides not
to accept a pretrial judge's plea offer, he would be entitled to have a
different judge preside over his trial and sentencing. As the next Sec-
tion discusses in greater detail, the rule on recusal would be more
feasible in federal court if magistrate judges managed pretrial
negotiations.
E. Maintaining the Efficiency of Plea Bargaining
Even if the measures discussed above minimize judicial coercion,
judicial involvement may still seem impractical because of the addi-
tional costs and time required. Judges have little time to take away
from their already overloaded dockets. Requiring a more complete
review of the facts, further investigation, and a more thorough disclo-
sure to the parties and the judge adds to the costs of judicial
involvement.
While there is no clear measure of the costs of the proposal put
forth in this Article, it is worth noting that proponents of judicial par-
ticipation, as well as observers from jurisdictions that allow such par-
ticipation, see it as a cost-saving measure.378 In civil cases, too, the
rise of managerial judges has been praised by some for streamlining
the process of discovery and settlement.379 Regardless of whether it
actually expedites plea discussions, judicial participation saves the
system some resources by reducing the number of motions and ap-
377. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1148.
378. See supra notes 269, 334 and accompanying text; see also Anderson, supra
note 357, at 52.
379. E.g., Jaclyn Barnao, In Pursuit of Settlement: Deciphering Judicial Activism,
18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETics 583, 586 (2005) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory commit-
tee's note to 1983 Amendment). But see Resnik, supra note 10, at 419-24 (questioning
this conclusion).
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peals that result from the unpredictability of current bargaining and
sentencing practices.
Much of the cost increase from judicial participation comes from
a more thorough review of the facts of the case-it takes more time
for judges to review a fuller investigative file, and it takes yet more
time if the judge orders that further evidence be taken. But this sac-
rifice of efficiency is likely to have a direct benefit in increasing the
accuracy and fairness of plea bargaining outcomes, a trade-off we
should not be quick to reject.
Furthermore, at least at the federal level, the concern about costs
can be alleviated by involving magistrates rather than Article III
judges in the plea negotiations. Magistrates already handle a num-
ber of tasks in criminal cases, such as initial appearances, bond set-
tings, and extradition hearings.3 80 Separately, they have taken a
lead role in managing settlement negotiations and discovery practice
in complex civil cases. There is also some evidence that they have
begun applying some of the lessons learned from civil case manage-
ment to their supervision of criminal investigations.38 '
In fact, with the defendant's consent, federal magistrates have
already been authorized to accept guilty pleaS3 8 2 and, in misde-
meanor cases, to impose sentences.383 As long as the defendant
agrees to this procedure, there is no clear constitutional or statutory
hurdle to involving magistrates in the plea negotiations.384 In Peretz
v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the delegation to a mag-
istrate of the authority to conduct voir dire proceedings, because the
defendant had consented to it. The consent made the delegation of
such essential judicial duties consistent with Article III. If the dele-
gation of voir dire responsibilities was upheld, then assigning plea
negotiations to federal magistrates would also be legal and practical,
as long as the defendant agrees to it. The delegation would be consis-
tent with legislative history of the Federal Magistrates' Act, which
encourages "innovative experimentations in the use of magistrates to
improve the efficient administration of the courts' dockets."38 5 Fi-
380. Daniel E. Hinde, Note, Consensual Sentencing in the Magistrate Court, 75
Thx. L. REV. 1161 (1997).
381. In re 3817 W. West End, First Floor Chicago, Illinois 60621, 321 F.Supp.2d
953 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
382. E.g., United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc); United States v. Torres, 258 F.3d 791, 795-97 (8th Cir.2001); United States v.
Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1994).
383. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(5) (2000), cited in Hinde, supra note 380, at 1164 n.20.
384. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (2000) (providing for the delegation of "additional duties"
to magistrates); United States v. Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 285-90 (4th Cir. 2003) (dis-
cussing statutory and constitutional grounds for delegating to magistrates the power
to conduct a plea colloquy); Hinde, supra note 380, at 1175-79 (discussing magistrates'
authority to hand down sentences in negotiated cases).
385. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 934-35 (1991) (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
94-1609, at 12 (1976)).
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nally, it would bring many of the benefits of judicial involvement in
plea negotiations, without unduly burdening the dockets of federal
district judges.
VI. CONCLUSION
Partly because of our adversarial tradition and partly because we
see plea bargaining as a contract between the prosecution and the
defense, we have decided to leave the process of negotiating the plea
to the parties. Since criminal justice also involves important public
interests, judges have been entrusted with the responsibility of veri-
fying that the plea is knowing, voluntary and factually based. Yet
there is reason to believe that passive, after-the-fact review of the
plea by the judge has not provided a sufficient safeguard of the im-
portant public interests in fair and accurate outcomes. This Article
has suggested that it is time to reconsider involving judges in the
plea negotiations.
The systems of Florida, Connecticut, and Germany offer three
different models by which a judge can play a more active role in the
plea negotiations. Each model has useful features that could be con-
sidered in efforts to reform other current plea bargaining systems.
To promote informed bargains, judges could tell the parties what
post-plea and post-trial sentences are likely to be accepted by the
court. To increase the fairness and accuracy of plea outcomes, judges
could inquire into the factual basis of the plea during the negotia-
tions, and where necessary, prod the prosecution to gather further
evidence. Finally, to minimize judicial coercion, appellate courts
could scrutinize more strictly allegations of threatening or biased ju-
dicial remarks. And the pretrial judge could be required to recuse
herself if the defendant rejects the pretrial plea offer and decides to
proceed to trial.
A plea bargaining process that is open to the more active role
played by the judge in these ways has greater potential to be fair,
transparent, and true to the facts. Several state systems, including
Florida and Connecticut, have already grown comfortable with a
higher level of judicial involvement, and Germany has endorsed even
more active judicial supervision of the plea negotiations. Reform-
minded courts and legislatures should study the effects of these dif-
ferent experiences and construct plea bargaining systems that com-
bine the best features of all three.
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I. TABLE: MODELS OF JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN
PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
Germany Florida Connecticut Proposal
Judge can initi- Yes. No. Yes. No.
ate discussions
Negotiations on Bare record of Yes, although No. Available upon
record the result of sometimes request by the
negotiations. ignored in prac- parties or the
tice. court.
Judge can dis- Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
cuss post-plea
sentence
Judge can dis- Yes. No. Yes. Yes.
cuss post-trial
sentence
Judge probes Yes. No. Sometimes- Yes.
into factual depends on the
basis of the plea judge.
during the nego-
tiations
Pre-plea disclo- Yes-open-file. Yes, liberal dis- Yes, liberal dis- Yes-open-file,
sure to the covery, although covery, although unless good
defense less than open- less than open- cause shown.
file. file.
Pre-plea disclo- Yes-full inves- Probable cause Probable cause Full investiga-
sure to the judge tigative file. affidavit; oral affidavit; oral tive file; oral
presentation by presentation by presentation by
the parties; pro- the parties; pro- the parties; pre-
bation report bation report plea probation
available, but available, but report.
rarely used. rarely used.
Different judge No. No. Yes. Yes-use magis-




Appellate review Yes, though not Yes. Yes, though not Yes.
of judge's very probing. very probing.
remarks for bias
